[For data on international relations leading to the independence of Lebanon and observations on nationalistic movements within Lebanon during the French Mandate, see Category IIk, pp. 78-129; and 272-286.]

[illegible], 718, 648, 664

[illegible]
Syria — [illegible]
Israel [illegible]
Jordan [illegible]
Iraq [illegible]
Lebanon [illegible]

//For an account of the formation and growth of the Arab Successor States after World War I, the Arab Nationalist Movement, relations between the Arab countries and the great Powers, see H. Sonné, [illegible] Middle East, category 116, pp. 77-87.//

[For a survey of the political history of Lebanon before and during the French mandate, and information on westernization, pan-Arabism, and nationalism in Lebanon, see Ph Hitti, 1633 Syria, category 11b, entire source.]

GOVERNMENT TRANSACTIONS

This section covers certain transactions of the Lebanese Government and of other governments and international agencies in Lebanon, not already mentioned either under merchandise trade, foreign travel or transportation. Specifically are included as a debit the Lebanese Government's expenditures abroad on diplomatic and consular representations, its contributions to international institutions, its scholarships to Lebanese students abroad, and its foreign debt payments; on the credit side, are listed the receipts from government credits abroad, consular receipts, royalties paid by concessionaires, local expenditures of international agencies, and the diplomatic, consular and cultural expenditures of foreign governments in Lebanon. In the latter, however, are not included those governments' expenditures for economic or technical assistance as these constitute technically "transfers", i.e., are transactions for which there is no quid pro quo whatever (cf. p. 48).

1. Debits

(a) The Lebanese Government's diplomatic and consular expenditures abroad can be easily ascertained from the final budget accounts; they are stated at L.L. 1.7 million in 1951 and L.L. 1.9 million (including payments made on the government year's account) in 1952. These figures include Lebanon's annual financial contributions to international agencies. These contributions are so small that it has not been thought worthwhile to list the items.

(b) Government scholarships to Lebanese students abroad, together with small educational grants, totalled L.L. 0.4 million in both 1951 and 1952. These include appropriations from the ministries of National Education and Agriculture and from the Directorate of Civil Aviation.

(c) In 1951, Lebanese interest on the borrowed to the official, oil and dollar reserves had to continue payment on the con-

[illegible] monetary transfer (i.e., 25%) of the quota of its subscription to the capital of the International Monetary Fund. For this purpose it had to repurchase from the Fund Lebanese currency for $14.06 million, or L.L. 3.5 million at the 1963 rate of exchange. As this transaction brought Lebanon's gold and dollar contribution to the required proportion of its quota, no further repurchase was necessary in 1963.

(ii) In 1963 and 1963, the Lebanese Government made yearly payments of L.L. 3.3 million to France in part settlement of a debt of L.L. 19.8 million which arose in 1946 as a result of the transfer to Lebanon of French property located on its territory. An annual instalment of L.L. 3.7 million was also owned to the British Government in payment for the Tripoli-Beirut Railroad. Total foreign debt payments were then L.L. 6.3 million a year.

(iii) Total debts under government transactions were, therefore, L.L. 9.6 million in 1963 and L.L. 9.3 million in 1963.

3. Credits

(i) When, as a result of the suspension of the Lebanese currency from the System in 1956, there [illegible] country's currency in circulation on its territory, Lebanon was left with a balance of L.L. 60.0 million. The Syrian Government agreed in 1963 to settle this balance in five equal semi-annual instalments. The first one (L.L. 6.0) was paid in October of that year. The Lebanese Government has no other credits abroad.

(ii) Lebanon's [illegible] receipts (i.e. income from fees, taxes and other dues charged by its consulates abroad) amounted to L.L. 6.0 million in 1963 and L.L. 6.4 million in 1963 and are so recorded in the final budget accounts.

(iii)(iv) The same accounts show that total receipts paid by foreign concessionaires (mainly oil) were L.L. 1.3 million in 1963 and L.L. 1.3 million in 1963. Other local expenses of these companies, for current operations, maintenance or expansion, are shown separately (cf. pp. 43-45).

(v) Expenditures of foreign diplomatic missions in Lebanon are difficult to estimate, as no information on the subject is released either by the Lebanese Government or by the

[illegible] normally necessary for an emigrant, presumably in order to obtain foreign exchange regulations in his country of residence, to request a third person who may be coming to Lebanon, or is doing business with Lebanon to pay a given sum to his relatives. Such payments naturally are not entered in bank accounts.

[illegible] It has been impossible to determine emigrants' transfers (i.e., the money they take with them) or funds subsequently sent to them. All the surveys that have been undertaken to date do not indicate anything on that point. A few bankers, known to be in relation with emigrants, were interviewed for that purpose. While refusing to give definite estimates, most of them assured again that annual transfers could not have exceeded L.L. 4 million in 1951 and L.L. 5.7 million in 1952: the difference between the two years reflecting the decline in emigration (cf. Table III).

c. Charitable and Cultural Institutions

[illegible] There are many charitable and cultural institutions in Lebanon, both Lebanese and Foreign which receive donations from abroad. A list of these institutions has been prepared, and a questionnaire sent to each requesting information on the total sum received in kind and in cash, with breakdowns for cash donations according to foreign currency received.[1] Almost all the listed institutions answered, and reported total donations of L.L. 16.5 million in 1951 and L.L. 13.3 million in 1952 (cf. Table III).

d. Governments

[illegible] Under this heading has been included American aid, under the Point IV cooperative programme and the French technical assistance. Both programmes were started in 1951 and have been expanding ever since. Actual expenditures under these programmes did not exceed L.L. 9.2 million in 1951 and L.L. 5.5 million in 1952. These figures, however, do not include the salaries paid by the foreign government concerned to the ever technicians employed under the aid programmes. The salaries have already been included under government transactions (cf. p. 38).

[illegible] See Appendix 4

the palace. Near the residence of the Pasha stands the principal mosque of Belgrade. It is appropriated to the use of the soldiers of the garrison, but is in very bad repair, the plaster having peeled off in large masses from the body of the building, as well as from the minaret by its side. Internally, the whole building is as ruinous as on the outside. Close to the gate which leads into the square stands a tomb, which a former pasha erected to the memory of his daughter, who has the reputation of a saint amongst the Turks. The tomb itself stands in a small apartment with glazed windows; and half a dozen wreaths of flowers strewed on the floor or hanging over the tomb, carried the imagination back to Père la Chaise, and the pot-hook immortelles of a French cemetery. Behind this and a second quadrangle are barracks for the accommodation of about four thousand men, and in a low irregular building in the main square are, at this moment, confined three hundred and sixty Druse prisoners. Their numbers, however, are fast diminishing: a disastrous fortress, a black hole almost as bad as that of Calcutta, and a sun at times hardly less powerful, are converting their sentence of imprisonment into one of death.

However strongly our sympathies are called forth for the suffering Christians of the Lebanon, I confess that the treatment which the Druse chieftains have received has always appeared a shocking instance of the capricious tyranny and injustice which are found throughout Turkey. These chieftains have but too faithfully complied with the traditions of their country and with the

9: Doctor M-S (ca. 1861) 1862
EFS Serbia EFS
Lebanon MF 1
Syria MF 6
Middle East-Turkish Royal MF 2

barbarous instigation of the Government, and it is hard that their fidelity should be rewarded with the cruel punishment which they are now suffering merely to enable that same Government to set itself right in the eyes of Christian Europe. Had it not been for the interference of England and France, it cannot be doubted but that the murder of the Slavonic Christians would have been tacitly approved or even actually rewarded by the Porte; but the authorities which at first prompted and then connived at the massacre of the Christians, have been allowed to purge themselves by visiting the consequences of their sin upon the heads of the instruments of the wrong. Turkey is governed not by acts of parliament, nor even by the hatti-sherifs and firmans of the Porte, nor by treaties made with foreign powers, but by public opinion and the Koran; and so long as the Koran, which is the very foundation of all authority in Turkey, prescribes or encourages acts of outrage towards unbelievers, it is hard that obedience to its dictates should, in order to satisfy the Western powers, subject men to the cruel and continuous torture under which the Druse chieftains are at this moment groaning and dying.

The government of five of the six fortresses which have been reserved by treaty to the Turks, together with the diplomatic intercourse with the Servian authorities, is at present divided between two Pashas, one of whom, Ashir Pasha, possesses the chief rank and authority, and resides in the palace within the fortress of Belgrade. To him is intrusted the conduct of the

of a governor for Lebanon before the latter was displaced by the French (whose historic interests in Lebanon had been recognized by the British Government in the correspondence with the Sherif Hussein). While Faisal and Lawrence were pressing the Arab case to the Paris Peace Conference, the French were consolidating their military hold on the Levant. Eventually Faisal and Clemenceau came to a provisional agreement for an autonomous Syrian state under the tutelage of France (as conceded by Britain in the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, which had not been communicated at the time to the Sherif and his sons); but French tutelage was not acceptable to the Damascus politicians who in March 1920 proclaimed Faisal King of an independent Syrian state. In the following month, however, the French obtained Britain's agreement, at the San Remo Conference, to their exercising a Mandate over Syria as well as Lebanon; the new Mandatory dislodged Faisal's little army at Maisalun on 25 July 1920 and entered into possession of Damascus, from which Faisal fled into exile.

The French Mandate, 1920–45

Since Crusader times, France had been interested in protecting the Christians of the Levant, and the twentieth century gave her the added incentive of creating a counter-balance to Britain's growing influence in the Middle East. The Maronites welcomed the French, and the latter accordingly expanded the small area of the Sanjaq of Lebanon to include the cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, as well as the Biqa, so as to give this 'Greater Lebanon' the largest possible area in which there would be no danger of a Muslim majority. The French applied to Syria the principle of *divide et impera* and four separate states were set up: that of the Alawis (Jebel Ansariya, including Latakia); that of the Jebel Druze, and Damascus and Aleppo (in 1925 combined into a single state of Syria). The French further encouraged separatism in the Jezira, and designated the area of Antioch and Alexandretta (in which the largest linguistic community was the Turkish) as an autonomous sanjaq.

The majority of Syrians never readily accepted French rule and risings occurred in the Ansariya, near Aleppo, and near Deir ez-Zor; these were soon put down but a greater rebellion began in the Jebel Druze in 1925 and spread to Damascus and to Hama. The French bombarded Damascus in October 1925 and in May 1926 but did not succeed in completely quelling the revolt until August 1927. Thereafter negotiations for a treaty stumbled through the years, punctuated by disturbances, broken off from time to time and marked throughout by intense-

Syria etc.

were on both sides. In Syria (and to a lesser degree, in Lebanon) the possibility of long-term cooperation between the nationalist politicians and the Mandatory was frustrated alike by the attitude of most French officials and by that of the local urban populations who, though they later signed the 1936 treaty, desired full self-government.[1] The advent to power in France of the Front Populaire in 1936 eased the situation: treaties with Syria and Lebanon were negotiated whereby the Mandate was to be transformed into an alliance with independent states, but under which France could still maintain troops in the Levant. However, the French Parliament was unwilling to ratify the Syrian treaty under the lengthening shadow of the impending Second World War, and Syrian indignation was increased when the cession of Hatay (Alexandretta, afterwards renamed Iskenderun) to Turkey by the League of Nations, effectively completed the process. Leading Syrian politicians refused to cooperate with the French on these terms, and on the eve of the outbreak of war the French High Commissioner once again suspended the Syrian constitution and governed the country through French and Syrian officials; the same procedure was applied to Lebanon after the outbreak of war.

When metropolitan France fell in 1940 the Mandate was carried on by the Vichy Government until the latter's acquiescence in the use of the Levant airfields by the German air force occasioned the intervention of British and Free French forces in June 1941. After a short but bitter campaign, the Vichy forces signed an armistice in July 1941. In the struggle between the Allies and the Axis and between Vichy and de Gaulle the Syrians and Lebanese took no part, but their independence had been promised by the Allied Governments. On behalf of the Free French, General Catroux, in a statement on 8 June 1941, proclaimed the end of the Mandate, but in fact the Free French regarded themselves as trustees for France's position, seeking to maintain them by installing Syrian and Lebanese supporters of France in the seats of authority. The Free French had, however, eventually to yield to the demand for popular elections, which was supported by the British Government as soon as the victory at el-Alamein (October 1942) had finally removed the threat of Axis invasion from the Middle East. In Syria the elections of 1943 brought into office the National Bloc with Shukri al-Quwatli as President of the Republic and Saadullah Jabri, Jamil Mardam, and Faris al-Khouri as parliamentary leaders. In the Lebanese elections the same year the leader of the 'Constitutional Bloc',

[1] For details, see A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London, 1954, 1946).

Bishara al-Khouri, became President with the pro-Arab Riyad as-Sulh as Prime Minister; these nationalists were not satisfied with mere titular sovereignty but claimed the reality of independence, and in November 1943 a Free French coup to force against them was averted only by a British intervention, endorsed by the United States Government. The Free French were then constrained to transfer more branches of the administration to the Syrian and Lebanese Parliaments, but retained control of the local 'Troupes Spéciales' and obstructed the proper equipping of the Syrian gendarmerie. The French intention was to make this vital conversion of authority conditional upon the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty which would give France much the same strategic, economic, and cultural advantages as Britain had obtained in Iraq by the already obsolescent Treaty of 1930. In March 1945 Syria and Lebanon had been admitted as sovereign states to membership of both of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States, but Syrian nationalists were not prepared to subordinate their sovereignty to an imposed alliance with France, and the landing of a 'contingent' of Senegalese troops immediately after V-Day (in disregard of a personal appeal of Churchill to de Gaulle) was regarded in both Syria and Lebanon as clear evidence of a French resort to coercion. Sporadic outbreaks of violence between the Syrian gendarmerie and the local nationalists on the one hand and the French garrison on the other became general, and when, at the end of May 1945, the local French Commander carried out a bombardment of Damascus the British Government ordered their Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to intervene, by force if necessary, to secure order in a region whose security was vital for British communications in the still-continuing war in the Far East. The crisis accelerated the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, concerning which the demands of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were supported by the Security Council; the process was completed in Syria by 17 April 1946 and in Lebanon by the end of the year.

Between the wars, the French Mandate had allowed political development in Lebanon to produce at least a façade of parliamentary democracy, with arrangements between the Muslim and Christian leaders on the division of political power and prerogatives, and the active commercial and intellectual life of Lebanon made progress with a minimum of government interference. In Syria, however, local opposition which French policy had encouraged made it very difficult for any Syrian Government to hold the people together. Even Damascus, the

Royal Institute of International Affairs [illegible]

foundations for commercial and intellectual progress were less firmly established than in Lebanon, and the Muslim leaders of the political parties were given little opportunity to acquire the technique of government. The root of the trouble was that the French were opposed to self-government and unable to refuse office to nationalist political leaders, except for short, self-defeating periods. But though they failed to foster self-government, the French did much good in both Syria and Lebanon as engineers, doctors, educators, and archaeologists, and performed a valuable service in training at least a cadre of competent civil servants.

With the end of the French Mandate there emerged two sovereign and independent Republics with many mutual and some conflicting interests. For some years the rest of the world failed to distinguish between the two, and it is still possible to find educated persons who suppose that Beirut is the capital of Syria. Syria and Lebanon are, in some senses, mutually dependent or complementary, but they are distinct and their political developments will be considered separately.

Government and Politics

(a) Syria

Under the constitution Syria is a Republic in which the legislative power is in the hands of a Chamber of Deputies numbering 114 members in 1949. The deputies are elected by direct suffrage granted to all men and to women of a certain educational standard. The representation of religious minorities is shown in the table on p. 488 above. The President of the Republic must be a Muslim and is elected for a term of five years by the Parliament; he nominates the Prime Minister who appoints his cabinet ministers. The Parliament is elected for four years but may be dissolved by the President. The constitution was suspended in 1949 by the military dictatorship and a new one on the Presidential model adopted in July 1950.

Damascus is the seat of government and there are ten provinces, each under a Governor who is assisted by a staff of civil servants representing most of the ministries. The provinces (*muhafaz*) are divided in areas, each under a *qaimqam*, who is a civil servant under the Ministry of Interior; the areas are divided into *nahiyas* under mudirs. Within a *nahiya* may be several villages, each of which is rather loosely under the control of the mukhtar who may be elected by the village or appointed by the ministry. The judiciary are independent of the legislature and

Lebanon 1958

had been fairer than in 1957 and the Opposition had gained seven seats. Abdullah al-Yafi became Premier in June 1957 and remained in office until his place was taken by another Constantinople, Ismet as-Sulh, in February 1958. Opposition to government by the party was still growing, and it is perhaps surprising that no more effective resistance had been made before. In August 1957 the followers of Jumblat and of Chamoun held a meeting at which the Government was attacked, and, although they had only a few seats in Parliament, they gained widespread popular support. The suppression of the Premier was not confined to the Opposition, for not long afterwards Ismet as-Sulh made a speech attacking him and his family. as-Sulh then resigned and the ministries were taken over and administered by civil servants. On 15 September the Opposition parties called a general strike and succeeded, with the aid of the chief of the armed forces, General Fuad Shihab, in bringing about the resignation of the President. General Shihab assumed interim powers as Prime Minister but he refused the presidency and, when the Chamber elected Camille Chamoun to be President, the General resigned to fulfil his pledge that the army would not interfere in politics. The new President found it hard to choose a Muslim Prime Minister who would enjoy the support of the Socialist Party and then at the end of September turned to Khalid Shihab, who had no political affiliations, and requested him to form a Government.

Shihab resigned on 28 April 1959 and was replaced by Sabi Barut but at the end of May President Chamoun dissolved Parliament. Elections were held in July under a new electoral law [promulgated by the President in the autumn of 1957], which reduced the number of deputies from 77 to 99, gave the franchise to women subject to certain educational qualifications, and made voting compulsory for men. Kamal Jumblat's Socialist Party won no seats and the Constitutional Bloc remained the strongest group, but no less than 19 independent deputies were returned. A new government was formed on 18 August by Abdullah al-Yafi, who himself became Minister of the Interior, of Defence and of Information, as well as Prime Minister. The other ministers, members of the Chamber of Deputies, had played no part in Lebanese political life during the previous twelve months.

External Problems and Relationships

Lebanon's attachment to the Western Powers as opposed to Russia is far more assured than that of Syria. The history of the Christians of Mount Lebanon leads them to seek close ties with

Europe and with the United States; but Lebanon has not moved out of step with the Muslim states around her, and she has followed the Arab League line over Palestine and in Egypt's quarrel with Britain and has not agreed to join a Middle East defence organization. She has, however, received arms and military training from Britain and has gladly accepted Point Four aid from the United States.

The main issue of external policy which exercises the Lebanese is the extent of the country's co-operation with Syria and the other Arab states. Some Christians advocate withdrawing the frontiers of the Republic to those of the old Sanjaq of Lebanon together with Beirut; some Muslims want Lebanon to reunite with Syria, and between these extremes discussion will continue. The disagreement with Syria is economic rather than political, but it might gain political significance if Lebanon were to feel isolated to the point at which she felt compelled to come to terms with Israel. At the moment, this is unlikely because Lebanon's friendship with the NATO Powers is a good security against possible incursions of enemies or friends.

Armed Forces[1]

Syria has compulsory military service of eighteen months and, since Shishakli's advent, the draft net is being cast over many who previously escaped. The armed services consume each year a growing share of the budget—in 1951 it may well go past one-third of the total—and in 1950 there were compulsory military courses for the army. The army is grouped in five brigades, each of rather less than 10,000 men, and has tanks, armoured cars, and light, medium, and anti-aircraft artillery and searchlights. Much of the equipment came from France and, though the rest does obtainable, is of doubtful serviceableness. However, Colonel Shishakli is determined to give the army good equipment, and a factory for minor armaments exists near Damascus. German instructors are used by the army and air force and are helping to produce light armaments. The air force is part of the army; 30 aircraft have been received from Britain and the air force still operates two Dakotas taken over from Syrian airways. The armed gendarmerie had its own equipment and fought well in Palestine; it is now under army control as are the police and the force used for bedouin control.

The Lebanese army is about a brigade strong and includes a regiment of armoured troops. Lebanese officers have had connection with the British Army and there is an R.A.F. mission with the Lebanese air force who are using Dr Vampires.

[1] In the following section the two countries are considered together.

[illegible]

[illegible]

ECONOMIC SURVEY

[illegible] Aleppo, and at Rayaq and there are [illegible] handling fields.

The Ports. Since 1950 Beirut has handled [illegible] a million tonnage of cargo a year, an increase of almost [illegible] quarter of a million over the previous figure. The port is a free zone through which goods are shipped to Syria, Iraq and Jordan. But the Syrian Government hopes to divert some of the transit trade from Beirut and has, with the assistance of a loan of £6 million from Saudi Arabia, formed a company to develop Latakia in order to handle about a million tons of goods a year (in 1952 [illegible] tons were handled). Work on the extension of the port was begun by a Yugoslav firm in April 1953. French, Italian, and Russian are ports handling the oil from the pipelines and are little used for other purposes.

Wireless and Telephone. An automatic telephone exchange system covers most of Syria and an automatic exchange is planned for Beirut. Telephone links with Europe and America are available through Beirut and normal communications with the Syrian state broadcasting authority has its large transmitters and broadcasts in Arabic, French, English, and Hebrew. Near Beirut there is a station which broadcasts in Arabic, French, and English.

The 'Common Interests'

Under the Mandates, Syria and Lebanon formed an economic and customs union, the Higher Council of Common Interests, under the direct control of France, which administered customs and excise and controlled communications, navigation, and some other services. On [illegible] control was transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The currencies were linked and interchangeable and both the Syrian and Lebanese pounds were largely backed by French francs based on a rate of 0·8p to the piastre (then worth 8p sgl). In order to maintain a good rate on the exchange brought in by oil companies the Lebanese and Syrian pounds were not devalued in 1949 to follow sterling. Exchange was controlled by one department for both countries and the note issue is in the hands of the French Banque de Syrie et du Liban.

But these links were incompatible with the difference that developed in the economic policies of the two countries when they became independent. Syria, in normal years, has a large exportable surplus of agricultural products and little wealth crude, whereas the debtor trade balance of Lebanon is main-

[illegible] See Appendix IV, p. 300 below.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] and cereals

[illegible] payments partly for her exports trade in goods and partly for her gold and currencies market. Syria adopted a controlled economy with import restrictions, protection of Syrian industries, and independence from French financial policy, but Lebanon's easiest way to encourage all trade movements and to rely on these support measures, the two countries could not agree on the division of customs dues. After years of arguments and negotiations the economic partnership was finally terminated on 14 March 1950 and customs posts were established along the common frontier. Since then agreements have been drawn up despite Syrian reluctance, but little has been achieved towards the re-establishment of economic union. It is therefore necessary to consider the economies of the two countries separately.

(a) Syria

[illegible]

Over half the [illegible] of Syria is, in fact, under cultivation. Since 1938 there has been a great increase in the number of pumps and tractors in use (there were 500 tractors in 1938 and [illegible] in 1951), as the following table shows, the cultivated area can still be extended.

[illegible] OF THE USE OF LAND, 1951

	Syria		Lebanon	
	'000 acres	Percentage of total	'000 acres	Percentage of total
[illegible]				
Cultivated under rainfall	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Cultivated with irrigation	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Forested uplands	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Unproductive				
Forests	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Deserts	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Rivers, mountains and waste	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total area	[illegible]	100	[illegible]	100

Sources: FAO, Outlook of Food and Agricultural Situation, 1951, Table 17; Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1951-52.

[illegible] progress in mechanized farming has been made in recent years, but much of the land is tilled as it was 2,000 years ago. The predominant form of land tenure is share-cropping, by tenants on estates of large and medium size. Small holdings under 25 acres prevail in areas of intensive cultivation, and in general are sufficient to maintain only 25 per cent of the rural

[illegible] CHECK AND CURRENCY

[illegible] particularly raw and other finished goods for which Lebanese merchants have agencies for the whole Levant. Another type of transit trade is the exchange and gold markets. In 1950 there was trading in precious metals to a value of £[illegible] million, which dropped in 1951 to £[illegible] and £[illegible] rose to 1952. On these transactions not only has the volume dropped but also the profit, but new rules were made in 1951 and 1952 when the margins on exchange and gold transactions were cut.

[illegible] Middle East anti-Arabian days have had effects on Lebanese commerce as it was bound, if Lebanon continues a policy of welcoming and facilitating foreign capital and merchants, there may be an influx of foreign concerns such as has already occurred as a result of the political disorders of 1951-2. (A tendency in the other direction can be seen in the taking over in March 1952 of the French Beirut electricity company.) But, on the other hand, growing nationalism, prohibitions, and intolerance in her neighbours could leave Lebanon on her own resources. Jordan and Syria are both trying to encourage their own ports and merchants at the detriment of Beirut, and Lebanon must now make her services as middleman and entrepôt more attractive and cheap so that her neighbours will continue to use them. At the same time, if these neighbours oppress Beirut too much, they might threaten Lebanon with ruin and it is conceivable that she might be compelled to attempt to win a replacement of the lost source of income in association with Israel.

Finance

The Lebanese pound of 100 piastres is covered by the French franc under an agreement of 31 January 1948, and Lebanon is a member of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with a quota of $22 million. At the end of 1951 40 per cent of the money circulating was covered by gold and a further 5 per cent by foreign currency—the gold cover has been steadily strengthened, to be 5 per cent at the end of 1950, to 27 at the end of 1951—when the gold backing amounted to £[illegible] million—and to be 6 per cent by April 1952. This increase in the gold cover results from the part-repayment of an obligation incurred by Syria in 1948, a further instalment was to be repaid in October 1952. In 1951 there were £[illegible] million in note circulation, £[illegible] million, and in 1951 £[illegible] million, but by the middle of 1952 the circulation had dropped to £[illegible] million and is estimated to amount this

[illegible]

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Lebanon MAE1

Still another important distinction is that between the old Sanjaq of Lebanon and the districts which were added to it by the French to make the Lebanese Republic, and which had formerly been part of the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus. The inhabitants of the former are mainly Maronites, Druzes and Greek Catholics; the latter include Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics in all parts, Armenians in Beirut, Sunnis in the coastal towns, Shi'is in the south and the Biqa'. The former have a tradition—a political tradition of autonomy, a social tradition of feudalism, a tradition of religious tolerance—which binds them together and which was sufficiently strong to make the autonomous Sanjaq function successfully; the latter, however, are not part of the Lebanese tradition and do not possess any common tradition of their own. In addition, at least one of the communities, the Sunnis, and important elements in most of the others, never wanted to be incorporated in Greater Lebanon. The tension between those communities which are part of the real Lebanon and those which are not still continues.

French Policy

A State so deeply divided both in structure and in ideas as the Lebanese Republic and without any unifying national spirit could not continue to exist, at least in its present form, unless there were some external power controlling it closely and interfering continually in its affairs. Until 1945, this external control was provided by the Mandatory Power. Her policy was directed towards making Lebanon a bulwark of French influence. This aim had led to the creation of an independent Lebanon and the extension of its frontiers. It also inspired the attempts to maintain a Christian majority in spite of the extension of the frontiers and the more rapid increase of the Moslem population: this was one of the reasons for the settlement of the Armenian refugees around Beirut. Every attempt was made to attach the Christians more closely to France: by the rapid and systematic spread of French culture, by favouring the Christians in political and administrative matters and by playing upon their fears of Moslem persecution. An analogous appeal was made to the heterodox Moslems, although to a less extent; and even with the Sunnis an attempt was made to Gallicize them by means of education.

Among the Christians preference was given to the Uniates and more particularly to the Maronites, who regarded themselves and were generally regarded as the dominant element in the life of the

Republic. At the same time, however, an attempt was made to keep the other sects hopeful and satisfied enough to prevent them trying to break up the Republic. This was done by the careful distribution of posts, large and small, among members of the different sects, and by the encouragement of Lebanese particularist feeling.

Sectarianism in Politics

In a country divided so fundamentally and in so many different ways, it has not been possible to create any genuine sense of solidarity. From its beginning, at least until 1943, the Lebanese Republic was only held together by the control and constant intervention of France; within the framework provided by that control, sectarian feeling maintained and even increased its strength.

The Constitution of the Lebanese Republic, promulgated in 1926, provided for a political organization which should take into account the sectarian divisions of the country. It laid down two principles. The first was that all Lebanese citizens were equal before law, possessed of the same rights and duties, and equally admissible to all public offices, without any distinction (Articles 7 and 12). The other was that, at least provisionally, the confessions should be equitably represented in public offices and in the Ministry, in so far as that did not detract from the welfare of the State (Article 95).

All parts of the political organization of the State show the influence of these principles. Thus the President of the Republic has always been a Christian. To counterbalance this, the Prime Minister has usually been a Sunni Moslem, and the other Ministries have been distributed among the confessions. The Chamber of Deputies, during periods when it has been functioning, has been so composed as to represent the confessions roughly in proportion to their numerical strength; deputies have been elected by their co-religionists, organized for the purpose on a confessional as well as a geographical basis.

In matters of appointments and promotions in the public service, the equitable representation of the sects is a more important consideration than merit, in the minds not only of those who make appointments but also of the public, and more especially of the leaders of the different communities, who watch closely to see that the balance is not overturned.

Lebanon, and then the way will be open for close relations, particularly in the economic sphere. As against this, those who hold either of the first two views look forward to a time when Lebanon will be a province, or most an autonomous province, of a Syrian or Arab State. The adherents of the fifth view, however, hope to see Lebanon a member-state of a Syrian or Arab federation, with the same status and freedom of action as other member-states. 23 9 | 8 6

Developments since 1941

From 1918, when the Lebanese Republic was established and its political machinery began to function, until 1941 there was no essential change in the structure of Lebanon. In 1936, it is true, a Franco-Lebanese Treaty was negotiated which provided for the complete independence of Lebanon after a number of years, but it was not ratified. 5-8 ●

In 1941, soon after the occupation of the Levant States by Allied Forces, General Catroux proclaimed the independence of Lebanon in a document which stated, among other things, that the Government of Lebanon would guarantee equality of civil, religious and political rights among all its nationals without any distinction.

In 1943 the first steps were taken to carry out the policy of independence by the holding of elections for the Chamber. The composition and actions of the Chamber and of the Ministry which emanated from it showed that a considerable change had taken place in the ideas and positions of the different sects during the past few years.

(i) The greater part of the politically conscious Lebanese desire an extension of autonomy, and are no longer willing to tolerate as great a measure of foreign interference in their internal affairs as under the French Mandate.

(ii) There is an increasing number who wish to end the French connexion altogether. This group is composed of two sections: first, those who still want foreign protection but believe that France is no longer capable of giving it, and therefore look to Great Britain to replace her; secondly, those who repudiate the whole idea of protection and believe that the only security for the special position of Lebanon lies in the good will of the neighbouring countries.

(iii) Many Arab nationalists who formerly desired the reduction

[illegible]

[illegible] Lebanon in the Arab World

[illegible] Lebanon in its old frontiers or even the closest complete abolition of its autonomy now desire to preserve the enlarged Lebanon at least as a temporary expedient: Greater Lebanon with its large (and increasing) Muslim population is much less whole-heartedly separatist than a smaller entity Muslim Lebanon would be, and in addition it provides the possibility for the development of a non-sectarian Arab nationalism. For the same reasons, many Lebanese nationalists now desire to return to the smaller Lebanon, with its large Christian majority.

All these problems were involved in the Franco-Lebanese crisis of November 1943. As a result of that crisis Lebanon secured a greater degree of self-government. A further step was taken in 1944, when representatives of the Lebanese Government participated in the conference of Alexandria which laid the foundations of the League of Arab States. The Protocol issued at the end of the conference in October contained a special appendix guaranteeing the independence of Lebanon within its present frontiers on condition that the Lebanese Government pursued the policy of independence which had been adopted in 1943. In 1945 agreement was finally reached on the withdrawal of British and French troops from Lebanon, whose independence thus became virtually complete. The deeper problems, however, of the structure of Lebanon and its relation to the outside world still remain.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

MANDATE FOR SYRIA AND THE LEBANON[1]

July 24, 1922

The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the territory of Syria and Lebanon, which formerly belonged to the Turkish

[1] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Empire shall, within such boundaries as may be fixed by the said Powers, be entrusted to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the populations, in accordance with the provisions of Article XXII (paragraph 4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for the territory referred to above should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it;[1] and

Whereas the terms of this mandate, which are defined in the articles below, have also been accepted by the Government of the French Republic and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas the Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the above-mentioned Article XXII (paragraph 6), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Art. 1. The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests, and wishes of all the populations inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory

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[illegible]

[1] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

shall further exert [illegible] the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent States. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Art. 4. The Mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the coming into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organize such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory, and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and the control which the Mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.

Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the territory.

The Mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and stores.

Art. 5. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon and with the right to issue exequatur to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon living outside the limits of the territory shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the Mandatory.

Art. 6. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

Art. 7. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable

in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular officials shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organization provided for in Article 6.

(2) Where the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the above-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously consented the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their re-application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall on the application of the member be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Art. 4. The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

Art. 5. Pending the conclusion of special conventions agreements, the conventions in force as between foreign Powers and the Mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

Art. 6. The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Art. 7. The Mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the Council of management (Conseil de fabrique) or in the management of religious communities and moral shrines

belonging to the various religions, the necessity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

Art. 10. The supervision exercised by the Mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with educational and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by the Mandatory or of the local governments, in regard to educational, public instruction and charitable relief.

Art. 11. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals, including societies and associations, of any State Member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals, including societies and associations, or with the nationals of any other foreign State in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, or navigation, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.

Subject to the above, the Mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and Customs duties as it may consider necessary. The Mandatory, or the local governments acting under its advice, may also conclude on grounds of contiguity any special Customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The Mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

Concessions for the development of those natural resources shall be granted without distinction of nationality between the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations, but on conditions

that they do not infringe upon the authority of the local government. Concession in the nature of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This clause shall in no way limit the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a purely local character in the interest of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and with a view to assuring to the territory the local resources which would appear best adapted to the local needs, or, in certain cases, with a view to developing the natural resources either directly by the State or through an organization under its control, provided that this does not involve either directly or indirectly the creation of a monopoly of the natural resources in favour of the Mandatory or its nationals, nor involve any preference that would be incompatible with the economic, commercial and industrial equality guaranteed above.

Art. 11. The Mandatory shall adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreement already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, in respect of the following: the slave trade, the traffic in drugs, the traffic in arms and ammunition, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, postal, telegraphic or wireless communications, and measures for the protection of literary, art or industrial.

Art. 12. The Mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and the Lebanon, so far as such, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of animals and plants.

Art. 13. The Mandatory shall draw up and put into force within twelve months from the date a law of antiquities in conformity with the following provisions. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archæological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 3, reports

the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(2) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

(3) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(4) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(5) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(6) Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Mandatory shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(7) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Art. 15. Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in Article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the Mandatory and the local governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the Mandatory in organising the administration, developing local resources, and carrying out permanent public works, of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

Art. 16. French and Arabic shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

Art. 17. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

[illegible]

Art. 16. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Art. 17. On the termination of the mandate, the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfilment by the Government of Syria and the Lebanon of financial obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the administration of Syria or of the Lebanon during the period of the mandate.

Art. 18. The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of this mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Members of the League.

Done at London on the twenty-fourth of July, 1922.

[illegible]

[illegible] The President may not exercise this right unless the budget Bills were submitted to the Chamber at least fifteen days before the commencement of the session.

During the extraordinary session, imposts, contributions, taxes, duties and other revenue shall continue to be collected as hitherto.

The expenditure for the month of January shall be based on the "provisional credits" of the expenditure for the previous financial year, plus the permanent additional and supplementary credits and minus the permanent reductions.

[illegible] The final accounts of the financial administration for the closed financial years shall be submitted to the Chamber and approved before the promulgation of the budget for the second financial year after that to which the accounts refer.

A special law shall be issued to govern the formation of an Accounting Department.

[illegible] No public loan or obligation involving a charge upon public funds may be contracted except by virtue of a law.

[illegible] No concession for the exploitation of natural resources of the country or a service of public utility and no monopoly may be granted except by virtue of a law and for a limited period.

[illegible]

[illegible] Nationals Subjects or new Statesmen there are now

Loyalty or Service

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] No provisional rules are laid for the sake of justice and economy, the conservation shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Cabinet, such measures, however, are to cause prejudice to the general welfare of the State.

[illegible]

[illegible] (See Above) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Syria.

AN AGREED BRIDGING ARMY TO END OF HOSTILITIES IN SYRIA AND LEBANON

Admiralty Statement on Duties

[illegible]

1. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., commander in chief of the Allied forces in Palestine and Syria, acting in the name of the commander in chief of the Middle East for the first part, and

General de Montsabert, Legion of Honor, assistant to the commander in chief of the troops of the Levant, acting in the name of the French high command for the second part, have reached an agreement bringing about the end of hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, by which the hostilities stopped July 11, 1941, at 2100 G.M.T. (Greenwich mean time).

II. The Allied forces will occupy the Syrian and Lebanese territories. The French forces will be concentrated in certain areas fixed by the committee composed of representatives of the two parties. This concentration should be achieved by Tuesday, July 15, 1941, at the same hour, at which the Allied forces will move toward the occupation of certain strategic points.

Until their supervision the French troops will remain with an Allied officer personnel under the French command, which will see after their supply and with the purpose keep the existing garrison under control. Special dispositions are foreseen for the town of Beirut, where for reasons of security French troops will stay in their garrisons until relieved by British troops.

III. In order to assure the public security, the occupation of the principal Syrian and Lebanese localities will be carried out according to a program which will permit the immediate replacement of the French forces by the occupying forces.

IV. The exit and entry visas will be declared to the occupying authorities.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

9. All the bases of war will be evacuated the French forces. These will withdraw to the concentration areas which have been designated, with all arms, including mortars, machine guns, fully automatic rifles and all their ammunition. All necessary measures will be taken by the French command to avoid arms and munitions being left abandoned on the field of battle wherever they are. The French military authorities will give all necessary assistance toward removing arms which may be found in the hands of the population.

10. In consideration of the leaves of war accorded the French forces, officers and non-commissioned officers and French soldiers are authorized to keep their individual arms (rifles or carbines, revolvers, bayonets, swords or sabers). Soldiers are to keep no munitions. In each unit, for security reasons, a reduced quantity of munitions are to be left. The police will keep its arms and a reduced quantity of munitions. All other war material, including guns of the coastal batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, as well as military vehicles, are to be evacuated under control of the British authorities. These will proceed with inspection of the material and will have the right to take over material which is necessary for them. The rest is to be destroyed by the French authorities under the control of the British authorities.

11. Prisoners of the Allied forces are to be immediately freed, including those who have been transferred to France. As far as the latter are concerned, the British authorities reserve the right to hold in captivity an equal number of French officers or be in position of the same grade until the prisoners transferred to France have been liberated.

French prisoners are to be liberated when all Syrian and Lebanese territory will have been occupied and the clauses of the present armistice fully executed. They are to be given an opportunity to rejoin their units with a view toward their repatriation.

12. The obligation of joining the Allied units or being re-pressed is to be left to the free choice of each individual, civilian as well as military. Civilians who do not join the Allied units may on their demand be permitted by the British authorities to remain in the Levant.

[illegible] (See Above) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

IX. Administrative officials and officials of the technical services and officers of special services are to remain in office a necessary amount of time to assure continuity of the administration of the country until they are able to be replaced. They then are to be repatriated if they express the desire. They are to be dismissed for a reprehensible attitude or insufficient service.

X. British authorities agree that the repatriation of French troops is to be carried out by French sea transports, provided this repatriation concerns only persons who opted for repatriation. British authorities have the right to control repatriation operations.

XI. Monetary possessions of repatriated French citizens are to be transferred according to methods to be established.

Those convicted are to receive payment on the favorable basis that applied to British subjects who recently left the Levant.

XII. French institutions (hospitals, schools, religious missions, etc.) are assured that their rights will be respected.

XIII. Administrations of public services and public utilities, including railroads, municipal transportations, electric installations and water systems, will be kept in functioning condition with their personnel and turned over intact.

XIV. All means of telephonic, telegraph and radio telegraphic communications, including wireless units, is to be turned over intact to the occupying authorities. The use of telegraph connections with France is to be assured for the French consulate on the same conditions as for other users.

XV. All port installations, naval establishments and all ships, including British vessels in Syrian and Lebanese territorial waters, are to be turned over intact to the occupying authorities.

XVI. All airplanes, all equipment and all armament installations in Syrian and Lebanese territory is to be turned over intact immediately after signature of the present convention.

The British are to be given an opportunity to utilize all airdromes and landing fields existing in Syria and Lebanon.

XVII. Stocks of fuel oil are to be delivered intact. However attention for military transportation are to be placed at the disposition of the French command.

XVIII. Money and other means of payment in circulation at

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5

Lebanon

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Lebanon, an independent republic since 1941, was formerly part of Greater Syria. It constituted one of the Levant states purchased in 1920 and governed by France under a mandate awarded by the League of Nations. Frequently designated as the "Switzerland of the Near East," Lebanon comprises a narrow strip of land along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean which has a coastline of about 140 miles and a total area of approximately 4,000 square miles. It is less than 70 miles in depth at its widest point, and is bounded inland by Syria on the north and the east and by Israel on the south.

The topography of the region is dominated by two mountain ranges which parallel the coast and are separated by a series of depressions, part of the rift which continues through the Jordan Valley and north to the great lakes of East Africa. The Lebanon Mountains, from which the country derives its name, rise abruptly from the coastal plain. They form a continuous chain of peaks, the highest of which is Qurnet as Sawda, with an elevation of 10,131 feet. The eastern range, collectively known as the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, extends along the Syrian frontier. Both the northern portion and the southern extension, usually called Mount Hermon, contain peaks from 7,000 to 9,200 feet in height.

Between the two mountain chains lies the fertile plain of the Bekaa: it is slightly over 10 miles in width in the north, but tapers toward the south. The northern Bekaa is drained by the Orontes River, which flows from its source in the Lebanon Mountains near Baalbek northward,

p. 109 (a)

have retained close contact with their homeland, a factor which has had a profound influence on the social and the economic development of the country.

Unlike the neighboring Arab states, Lebanon is a compact territory. The density of population in the four administrative provinces, exclusive of Beirut district, averaged over 300 per square mile in 1946. It was 464 per square mile in Mount Lebanon, 356 in North Lebanon, and 291 in South Lebanon, but declined to 101 in the potentially fertile districts of the Bekaa. About 60 per cent of the inhabitants live under rural conditions in some 1,300 large or small villages. Urbanization has increased progressively within recent years, however, and almost one half of the population is now concentrated within easy access of Beirut. The city, which is not only the capital and the industrial metropolis of Lebanon but the principal port for the Levant states, had a population of 300,000 to 400,000 in 1950. Tripoli, the second largest city and the terminus of the pipeline from the oil fields in northern Iraq to the Mediterranean, had a population of roughly 70,000. Numerous towns in the southern and the central portions of the Lebanon range are popular resorts, with an annual influx of summer residents.

The fact that Beirut has become one of the leading cultural and educational centers of the Near East has stimulated the spread of education in the rest of the country. The literacy rate is consistently higher among the men than among the women: it probably averages from 75 to 90 per cent in Beirut and the neighboring districts of Mount Lebanon and from 40 to 60 per cent in the other provinces. The expansion of education has been influenced by the activity of French, American and other foreign groups, but the division between the different systems has hindered the development of a unified national program. Theoretically, primary education is compulsory, although the facilities are inadequate, especially in the rural areas of the south.

schools are maintained by the Lebanese government under the authority of the Ministry of National Education and by private, denominational and foreign agencies. There are no public secondary schools, and institutes for advanced education are maintained almost exclusively by private or foreign organizations.

There are two universities in Beirut, both of which have made substantial contributions to educational and social leadership throughout the Near and Middle East. The Université Saint-Joseph, which was founded in 1875, is operated by Jesuit orders, and some of its departments are subsidized by the French government. It has faculties of law, theology, engineering, philosophy, oriental letters and medicine, with constituent schools of dentistry, pharmacy, nursing and midwifery. The American University of Beirut was established as the Syrian Protestant College in 1866, and renamed in 1920. It is a nonsectarian, autonomous institution, sponsored by the Near East Colleges Association. The present university incorporates schools of arts and sciences, engineering, medicine, pharmacy and nursing, as well as a new school for agriculture, organized in 1952.

Vital Statistics

No reliable vital statistics are available for Lebanon. The registration of births and deaths is compulsory by law, but reporting is irregular, and the facilities for the compilation and the analysis of statistical data are inadequate. The published statistics are incomplete and of little value in the interpretation of true birth and death rates. No census has been taken since 1932, but, on the basis of the official population estimates, the birth rate was calculated at 31.3 per 1,000 population in 1947 and at 29.1 in 1948. The death rates were given at 5.3 and 6.1 per 1,000 population, respectively, figures which are obviously low.

The infant mortality rates are unknown. The general laxness in reporting births in many rural villages and the tendency to

[illegible] *A. stephensi* breeds in wells, cisterns and other accumulations of water devoid of vegetation, and is often a prominent vector in or near towns and villages, particularly in the drier sections of South Lebanon and the Bekaa. It is sometimes associated with *A. superpictus* in shaded and exposed stretches of the smaller streams. This species breeds throughout the year, but seldom appears in significant numbers before March or April.

[illegible] Numerous other types of mosquitoes are present, but, with the exception of *Culex pipiens*, they are of no known medical importance. *C. pipiens* is responsible for the transmission of dengue fever, which occurs in sporadic outbreaks. Several species of *Culex* have been recorded, including *C. territans* (= *C. pipiens molestus*), the prolific vector to occasional cases of filariasis and one of the most annoying pest varieties.

[illegible] Anopheline control measures are undertaken by several agencies, but up to the present there has been no central governmental program covering all parts of the country. The antimalaria service of the Ministry of Public Health started control operations in the Damour plain, south of Beirut, in 1941. The work, which originally combined swamp drainage and antilarval measures, has gradually been extended, with considerable success, to other portions of the littoral and to limited inland areas, especially in the populous districts to the north and the south of the capital. Larvicidal DDT sprays and residual spraying in the towns and the villages with DDT preparations or Gammexane have been used almost exclusively since 1946.

[illegible] The Near East Foundation, in co-operation with the Ministry and other agencies, carried on an extensive malaria control campaign in the central Bekaa valley from 1942 to 1951, when it closed its headquarters in Lebanon. Anopheline vectors of malaria have been almost eliminated from the major villages and about 300 square miles in the Aamiq swamp region, south of Riyak. The measures employed included drainage, the

[illegible]

[illegible] residual spraying of the village houses with insecticides, the treatment of breeding places with larvicides, the screening of permanent houses of rooms with insecticide fish, and the airplane spraying of otherwise inaccessible villages with DDT preparations. The villages protected in this manner in 1951 had an aggregate population of about 60,000.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees continued DDT residual spraying programs in camps and refugee villages subject to malaria infestation, especially in the highly endemic coastal areas in the south and in the Jordan plain near the Syrian border. In September, 1951, demonstration projects were initiated by the World Health Organization, in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Health. The programs will include systematic surveys in partially controlled and uncontrolled endemic areas, as the Jordan plain, the northern and the southern sections of the Sahara, the Ghazal around Tyre and the more remote villages in the coastal river valleys.

Flies. Flies of the family *Simuliidae* are important in all parts of the country, and undoubtedly play a significant role in the spread of bovine[illegible] and eye diseases. Several species of *Musca* occur, among which *M. domestica vicina* and *M. sorbens* are very prominent. The noble fly, *Stomoxys calcitrans*, and the stabbing variety, *Haematobia stimulans*, are also plentiful. Species of *Haematopota* are numerous. The cytotoxic-producing flies, which are serious pests for the livestock and occasionally attack man, include *Chrysomyia albiceps*, *Cochliomyia erythrocephala* and various species of *Sarcophaga* and *Wohlfahrtia*. The flies most frequently implicated in human myiasis are probably *Lucilia sericata* and *Wohlfahrtia magnifica*.

Several species of sandflies have been identified, including *Phlebotomus papatasii* and *P. sergenti*, vectors of cutaneous leishmaniasis in mankind, and *P. alexandri* and *P. major*, suspected of being vectors in

[illegible] and medical welfare control operations of the Ministry of refugee affairs.

Hospitals and Dispensaries

[illegible] Hospitals and Dispensaries. According to the official statistics for 1956, there were 15 hospitals, including maternity, in Lebanon. These institutions had an aggregate capacity of about 3,000 beds, or slightly less than 1.1 beds per 1,000 population. Fifty-six hospitals with a total of 1,274 beds were under private management, and 7 hospitals with a total of 1,216 beds were operated by foreign agencies. Eight hospitals, with a total of about 111 beds, were found by the Ministry of Public Health. They consisted of provincial hospitals of approximately 100 beds each at Nabatiya (Mount Lebanon), Saida (Sidon), Tripoli (North Lebanon) and Sour (South Lebanon), and a hospital in Beirut, a general hospital of 200 beds, a neuropsychiatric hospital of 50 beds, a maternal-disease hospital of 40 beds and a preventive hospital of 40 beds. The provincial hospitals at Tripoli and Sour were not completed, however, in 1956. In addition, the government contracted for the use of 1,200 beds in private or foreign-operated institutions, so that roughly 1,300 beds were available through the Ministry.

Special facilities included with the above hospitals were a tuberculosis preventorium of 200 beds at Dhoumit, three smaller tuberculosis sanatoria of 120 to 150 beds each, a mental hospital with 600 beds at Ashrafieh and a chronic-disease hospital and home with about 1,200 beds at Deir el Salib, all are conducted by religious or philanthropic organizations, Lebanese or foreign. The Ministry does not operate tuberculosis or mental hospitals, but subsidizes about 270 beds in private institutions for the care of tuberculous patients and 450 beds for mental cases. Within the last few years an ophthalmic hospital of 40 beds has been constructed by the government at Tripoli, in North Lebanon.

[illegible] The hospitals affiliated with the medical [illegible] schools of the two universities in Beirut are

p. 180(a)

[illegible]

[illegible] Doctor of Science or Medicine. The teaching [illegible] is in English. In 1951, the Department of Preventive Medicine and Public Health was organized and reorganized as a regional training center in public health to serve all the countries of the Near and Middle East. The new Department, which forms the nucleus of a projected school of public health, is sponsored by the University and [illegible] Foundation, Inc. The Technical Co-operation Administration of the United States government and the World Health Organization. Its objectives include the training of different types of [illegible] personnel, the organization of facilities for [illegible] in connection with governmental agencies [illegible] and other countries, and the conduct of research and field investigations. In 1951-52, the Department offered a 1-year course for the training of sanitarians, a 1-year course in laboratory technology, a 1-year refresher course for medical technologists and a 1-year postgraduate course in public health for nurses. Plans are also under consideration for the development of short refresher courses in specialized fields for physicians and other medical personnel.

A School of Dentistry is connected with the Faculté Française de Médecine, and includes a 4-year course leading to a degree in dentistry and a 2-year course for dental mechanics. A School of Pharmacy, each requiring 4 years of study, are attached to the French and the American universities.

There are 4 schools for the training of nurses. The School of Nursing of the American University of Beirut provides a regular course of 3 years comparable with that given in approved schools in America. The school attached to the Faculté Française de Médecine, and the school opened by the Young Women's Moslem Association in Beirut in 1949, offer 3-year courses. The Lebanese Red Cross maintains a school in Beirut which has a 3-year course for nurses and a 1-year course for nursing assistants. The Kennedy Memorial Hospital in Tripoli conducts a school for the training of male and female nurses with a 3-year course of

p. 181(B)

p. 132 (4)

[illegible]

[illegible] 5)

Lebanon has no relations to the United States, France or some other Western country.

Lebanon joined the Arab League, very hesitatingly, because it wanted the League's support in its campaign for complete independence from France.

Typical of Lebanese reservations in support of Arab nationalism is the fact that the Maronites, who number 350,000 and are the largest single group in the country, have never shown opposition to the Zionist movement in Palestine. Both the Maronite archbishop of Beirut, Mgr. Ignace Moubac, and the Maronite Patriarch have come, in the past, to recognize the progress and civilization which the Jews have brought to the Middle East.

The Lebanese Jewish community is mainly concentrated in the capital, Beirut, with a smaller number living in Tripoli in the north, and in Tyre and Sidon in the south. They are as deeply rooted in the country as any other group; the Jews include prominent leading men in political circles. Like the Christian population, they have gladly accepted the influence of Western civilization. Most of them are [illegible] conversant in French and French. For many years they have suffered no restrictions in either commerce or the liberal professions, and they form a fair proportion of the middle class, some Jews holding high positions in the Government service. Jews are not confined to any special area, though most of the poorer Jews live in streets which, in former times, used to be a Jewish quarter.

As a member of the Arab League, Lebanon found itself willy-nilly [illegible] bound to take part in the invasion of Israel. Since the fighting in Palestine had started, the Government was forced to apply security measures similar to those introduced in all countries of the Arab League.

All foreign Jews, including the students at the American University and the French college, were ordered to leave the country in January, 1948. When military operations started in May, 1948, about 200 political suspects were arrested. According to a Reuter message sent from Beirut at that time, however, they included only a few Jews.

The hysterical Jew-hating which then broke out throughout the Moslem Arab countries naturally affected also Lebanese Moslems. On May 15, an anti-Jewish demonstration consisted in the early hours and a mob, armed with knives, incendiary bombs, and sticks, proceeded towards the Jewish quarter. The President of the Jewish community received a telephone call from the head of the Christian Arab community, suggesting the Jews should take steps to guard their houses.

When the mob reached the Jewish quarter, they were halted by guards who had been posted there by the Christian Arab community. At the request of the President of the Jewish community, the authorities sent armed troops, who prevented the rioters from entering the quarter.

[illegible]

[illegible] one large [illegible] the joint property of three Muslims and one [illegible] belonged.

These have sent a few residents during the months of fighting in Palestine. On one occasion shots were fired [illegible] when a mobile [illegible] of the military [illegible] Jerusalem opened a few rounds.

When leaving the agreement to Galilee, large numbers of Arab refugees entered the country and Israel forces occupied some territory in Southern Lebanon. Whatever in the Sidon area added [illegible] buildings and [illegible] refugee [illegible]. After some days however, the Government ordered the police to provide protection for the Arab and to restore the buildings to their owners. Arab were not allowed to leave the country, but special permits were issued for travelling to Syria on business.

On the advice of well-disposed Government officials, the Syrian did all they could to keep quiet and to remain aloof. The visit to [illegible] was followed but the Israeli newspapers [illegible] (The Prime Minister) to change to [illegible] (Finance). On the other hand, the Israeli [illegible] had to yield to the pressure of public opinion and to contribute considerable sums towards the Arab Palestine Fund. The total amount is estimated to be not less than £1,500,000 [illegible] (£1,000). The Arab never reached the stage where they could not carry on their occupations, and the merchants among them were always able to keep their businesses running.

As soon as the fighting was over, the Lebanese Government was the first to restore normal conditions for the Jewish population. The ban on travelling abroad was lifted, and a number of senior Jewish officials who had been dismissed were reinstated, some even being promoted. Those Jews who had fled to Lebanon from Iraq [illegible] Jews had been [illegible] to death in absentia and three other Jews, who had previously lived in Palestine, were permitted to leave the country for Israel.

There is every evidence that with the return of normal relations with Israel, the Jewish minority in Lebanon will enjoy again the freedom, the full and equal rights, and the friendly relations with their neighbours which existed before the invasion of Palestine.

[illegible]

[illegible]

is possible for the Lebanese more faithfully to perform their duty to Christendom.

Finally, the establishment of the French Mandate, and the system which has existed between the mandatory authorities and the bulk of the population, have placed a number of difficulties before those communities which have a special connection with the French. Should they cling to the French connection even at the cost of a deep estrangement from the rest of the population of Syria and Lebanon? Should they throw in their lot with their fellow-countrymen even at the cost of abandoning their connection with France? Can a middle way be found between these two difficult goals?

II

Thought about these problems, at different levels of profundity, has led the inhabitants of the Mountain to a number of alternative conceptions of the nature of Lebanon. These conceptions are often expressed in the form of historical or ethnological answers to the question whether the Lebanese are or are not Arabs; for example, there is a school of thought which emphasizes their Phoenician origin. On the basis of them, however, there is something more than an assertion of fact; there is a view of the function which Lebanon should perform, an answer to the question what her relations should be with the West and with the Arabs.

There are some who do not regard Lebanon as possessing a special mission. For them the Lebanese are simply a branch of the Arab people, distinguished from the other branches by nothing of political significance; their destiny is indistinguishable from that of the Arab people as a whole. Others do not go quite so far. They admit that history and tradition give Lebanon a slightly different character from the other Arab regions; but they do not regard this difference as forbidding the basis of a special mission or destiny in the present. It is nothing but a relic of a past age, an obstacle to be overcome before the Lebanese can fulfil their true function, which in the view of this as of the first group is to become a full part of the Arab people.

A third group believes in a special function for Lebanon, but a restricted one. It is to continue to provide an asylum for those whose religious loyalties or racial origins make it difficult for them to live in neighbouring regions. This,

9. [illegible]

The political experiments described in the last chapter [illegible] fundamentally unchanged until 1926. In two out of the four units the years 1920–1926 were on the whole marked by political tranquillity and administrative progress. In Lebanon, constitutional development was more rapid than in the other States. In 1923 the High Commissioner entrusted the Representative Council with the task of drafting a new constitution for the State. The constitution was promulgated in May, 1926. It provided for the establishment of normal republican institutions: an elected President, who by convention was always a Christian; a responsible Ministry; an elected Chamber and a nominated Senate, which after a time were combined into a single Chamber, two-thirds elected and one-third nominated. Articles 90 reserved the rights and duties of the Mandatory Power, as derived from Article 22 of the Covenant and from the Mandate; while Article 91 stated that when circumstances permitted Lebanon would apply for admission to the League of Nations, and in doing so would have recourse to the good offices of the Mandatory Power.[1] Modified in 1927 and 1929, the Constitution was suspended in 1932 because it had proved too cumbersome and expensive; the administration was carried on directly by the President of the Republic, until in 1934 the High Commissioner issued a decree provisionally re-establishing a small Chamber.

Some of the Muslim and other elements in Lebanon were immediately responsive to movements of opinion in the State of Syria and the rest of the Arab world, of which they considered Lebanon to form a part. But to a great extent Lebanese political life developed in its own way. It was dominated by the problems arising from the extension of the frontiers in 1920. Lebanon as it existed before 1914 had contained a large Christian majority; but in the Lebanese Republic established in 1920 Christians formed scarcely more than 50 per cent of the population.[2] Moreover, both Christians and Muslims were subdivided into a number of sects, the largest of which, the Maronite sect, included only 30 per cent

[1] For text of the Constitution, see P. K. and P. Thomas, *La Constitution libanaise* (Paris, 1932). Volume V, pp. 140–43.

[2] See Chapter VII.

of the population. Several of them were possessed a local predominance in some part of the Republic: the Maronites in the north, the Druzes in the south, the Sunnis in the coastal towns of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, and the Shi'is in the Bekaa valley and the extreme south. The consequences which are likely to flow from such a situation are clear. The political life of the Republic was deeply affected by the struggle for equality of opportunity between a number of communities, some of them so strong as to be able to dominate all the rest. Sectarian loyalties and sectarian jealousies thus continued and perhaps strengthened themselves. In addition, the dominance of the spiritual leaders over the members of their communities was perpetuated; the Maronite Patriarch, in particular, exhibited an unbalanced influence over the political life of the country.

The importance of communal difference in Lebanon was recognized by the Mandate. Article 2 stated the necessity of guaranteeing the most complete liberty of conscience and worship; the equal treatment of all inhabitants irrespective of differences of race, religion and language; and the right of communities to maintain their own schools. Article 6 required the Mandatory Power to respect the personal status and religious interests of the different sections of the population. These guarantees were reaffirmed in the Lebanese Constitution, promulgated in 1926, Article 9 of which declared: "Liberty of conscience is absolute. In rendering homage to the Most High, the State respects all confessions and guarantees and protects the free exercise of them, on condition that no harm is done to public order. It guarantees equally to populations belonging to every rite respect for their personal status and their religious interests."

These guarantees were respected by the Mandatory Power to a considerable extent. For example, the traditional jurisdictions of the communal courts were maintained in some matters of personal status, although a large proportion of such matters were transferred to the civil courts. An attempt was made in 1936 to define the whole position of the communal jurisdictions. The High Commissioner issued a decree in which the historic communities were given explicit legal recognition. Their statutes were given the force of law, and

It is doubtful if the system could have worked even as well as it did had it not been for the control and intervention of the Mandatory Power. But this again was a source of trouble. The French authorities were believed to be not altogether impartial in their efforts to hold the balance, and to show excessive favour to the Maronites and other Uniates. Thus the other communities became hostile both to France and to the Maronites. This hostility in its turn cemented the alliance between the two.

The situation just described had the approval of the majority of the Maronites, who chiefly profited by it. Many of the religious and secular notables of the other communities also did not disapprove of the conception of a Lebanon based upon sectarianism, either because they derived advantage from it or else because they could not conceive of any loyalty except that to the religious community. But the more thoughtful members of both the Maronite and the other sects, and especially the younger of them, saw the need for the creation of some sort of corporate consciousness or sense of solidarity. In the Sanjaq of the years before 1914 this had to some extent existed; it had been based upon a common way of life and a common tradition of autonomy which all alike had valued. In the new Republic this was lacking and would have to be created. On the question of what form it should take, different opinions were held, corresponding in the main to the different conceptions of Lebanon expounded in Chapter VII. Those who regarded Lebanon as an asylum for religious minorities, together with those who regarded the Lebanese as a distinct people, wished to create a specific Lebanese nationalist spirit transcending communal differences; and they wanted the enlarged Lebanon to be an independent state, protected by or in alliance with a European Power who would take an interest in it which was other than purely political. Those who looked upon Lebanon as a point from which Christian and Western influences could radiate throughout the Arab East, wished to encourage the consciousness of Lebanon as both a distinctive unity and part of a larger unity; for them, Lebanese autonomism and Arab or Syrian nationalism were not opposed to each other but complementary, and they desired to see Lebanon, with or without the restoration of its

mentioned, were to enter into force when Syria should be admitted to the League of Nations. But there was a long process to be accomplished before that should happen. First the Treaty must be signed by whatever Government issued from the elections shortly to be held in Syria. Then it would need to be ratified by the French and Syrian Parliaments. After ratification would come a transitional period of three years, during which the machinery of an independent State would gradually be constructed. Only when that period had ended would Syria apply for admission to the League of Nations.[1]

The Lebanese Treaty was in principle similar to the Syrian. The only important differences were that it was to be renewed by tacit consent at the end of twenty-five years; that the military convention placed no limits upon the employment of French forces; that the exchanges of letters contained explicit guarantees for equality of civil and political rights between all nationals, and for the equitable representation of the different sections of the population in the Government service; and that the Lebanese Government undertook to carry out a programme of administrative and fiscal reform.[2]

The signature of the Treaty was received with approval by a certain body of opinion in France. The view of the parties forming the Popular Front was expressed by M. Pierre Viénot, who had played a leading part in the negotiations. In a speech made at the ceremony of signing the Treaty, he stated that the new alliance between France and Syria did not represent a fundamental change in policy so much as a new form which the traditional relations between the two countries had taken. The Treaty defined the international position of Syria, and at the same time ensured the maintenance of France's collaboration in the economic and cultural life of the Syrian people. In another statement on the same day, he declared that while the Treaty was modelled on that between Great Britain and Iraq, in one respect France had learned by Britain's mistakes, and had provided for the protection of the minorities.

Nor was approval confined to the Left Wing. *Le Temps*, for example, in a leading article published on September 8th, declared that by the conclusion of the Treaty France had fulfilled her whole duty as Mandatory Power. The solution

[1] For the text of the Treaty, see Appendix No. [illegible].
[2] See Appendix No. [illegible].

of the minority problem contained in it was satisfactory. When the Treaty was ratified, it would firmly establish on a contractual basis a French influence which the too-long maintenance of an authoritarian régime might in the long run compromise.

3

In Lebanon the signature of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty was welcomed by the Maronites and some other sections of the population. The Sunnis, however, regarded it as a blow to their aim of reunion with Syria; their anger found expression in communal clashes in Beirut and elsewhere at the end of 1936. In spite of their opposition, however, steps were immediately taken to carry out the policy of the Treaty by re-establishing self-governing institutions. The Constitution of 1926 was restored in January, 1937; the Chamber met, and Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, a Sunni, formed a Ministry. But it soon became apparent that the signature of the Treaty and the revival of constitutional forms had not affected the essential nature of Lebanese political life, which continued to be dominated by sectarian issues.

A new electoral law was passed in 1937, replacing the existing Chamber by a new and larger one, two-thirds elected on a sectarian basis and one-third nominated. The elections of November, 1937, were marked by corruption on an extensive scale; and the Chamber which resulted from them, and which remained in being until 1939, was remarkable only for the bitterness and complexity of its internal dissensions. The Ministries of the Amir Khalid Shihab and Abdullah al-Yafi succeeded those of Khair ad-Din al-Ahdab, and none of them had any notable legislative or other advance to show.

The consequence of this was a general loss of interest and faith in the constitutional system as it existed in Lebanon. It was not simply that the established leaders and the parliamentary parties, the Unionists, Constitutionalists and so on, ceased to possess even so limited a hold over public opinion as they had perhaps had; more than that, Lebanese began to ask themselves what purpose was served by the existence of a costly Parliament, filled with landowners and lawyers, wasting its time in interminable quarrels and showing no effective interest in the country's welfare. Had not Lebanon been better ruled under the simple system which had existed

sterling bloc. Syria, having now entered the sterling bloc, will in the economic and financial sphere and especially in that of exchange take the necessary measures to follow the general policy of the sterling bloc.

'The preceding stipulations reconcile respect for Syrian independence and sovereignty with the necessities of war. They are inspired by a single thought, that of winning the war and by this means assuring to Syria the future of a free people. They give the Franco-Syrian problem a solution which springs from the desire of Free France not to retard, in spite of the war, the accomplishment of Syrian national aspirations and the fulfilment of the undertakings of the Allies. But it is necessary that a final settlement should be substituted for them as soon as possible, in the form of a Franco-Syrian Treaty which will definitively guarantee the independence of the country.

'Long live independent Syria! Long live England! Long live France!'[1]

C

At the same time the new President of the Syrian Republic took up his duties. In October Shaikh Taj was able to announce the formation of a Government, at the head of which was Hasan al-Hakim, a well-known financial expert and a former collaborator of Dr. Shahbandar. Among the members of the Ministry were an Alawi and a Druze, but none of the leaders of the Bloc.

The declaration of independence and the formation of a Government aroused no enthusiasm among the population. The nationalists preferred to wait before giving their approval, to see what steps Free France would take to render her undertakings effective. They also objected to the appointment of the President instead of his choice by a freely elected Chamber; and in particular they disapproved of the appointment of Shaikh Taj.

II

L

The independence of Lebanon was proclaimed two months later, on November 26th, 1941. General Catroux's proclamation ran as follows:

'Lebanese,

'The proclamation which I addressed to you on June 8th in the name of General de Gaulle, Chief of Free France, and

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A 14.

which Great Britain supported by a special simultaneous declaration, recognised Lebanon, under the guarantee of a treaty to be concluded with a view to defining Franco-Lebanese reciprocal relations, as a sovereign and independent State.

"As the native for the French liberal tradition and anxious to honour the engagements undertaken towards you, Free France, at the moment of entering the Levant, began with acts of emancipation, in spite of the war and the exceptional circumstances which it imposed: she made you free and independent.

"Your aspirations are satisfied. It is now a matter of organising your independence. As far as I am concerned, I have two tutelary duties. The first is to confide the work of installing and directing the régime to a man fully qualified to accomplish this difficult task in present circumstances. After very extensive consultations both with individuals and with public opinion throughout the whole extent of the territory, I have understood that the hopes of the Lebanese nation are fixed upon His Excellency M. Naccache. I have asked him to remain in power with the title and prerogatives of President of the Republic, and to govern by means of a ministry which will be responsible to him and in which the just representation of all the regions and communities which form the Lebanese nation will be assured.

"I assure President Naccache, as well as the Lebanese community, of my friendship and entire support.

"The second task is to define the spirit and forms of the collaboration to be established between Lebanon and Free France, while awaiting the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and friendship.

"In recognising your independence, France is inspired solely by her traditional friendship with Lebanon, by her tutelary mission in this country throughout the centuries, and by the privileged position which she has thus acquired. Her aid remains assured to Lebanon in all things, in the spirit of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of Alliance and Friendship of 1936, which received the unanimous approbation of the Lebanese population. Moreover, the circumstances of war and the occupation of Lebanese territory by the Allied forces place Lebanon temporarily in a special position.

There flow from this a certain number of rights and obligations, among them in particular those stipulated below."

The remainder of the proclamation was substantially the same, with minor and verbal variations, as the proclamation of Syrian independence.[1]

This declaration was received lukewarmly by the greater part of the population. It was open to objection on various grounds. Those who advocated the union of Lebanon with Syria regarded the proclamation as a repudiation of the promise contained in Catroux's statement of June 8th, that the Syrians and Lebanese would be free to form themselves into separate States or to unite into a single State. They objected also to the assertion that Lebanon was politically and territorially an indivisible unit. A similar statement had appeared in the Syrian proclamation and had there been open to no objection; but in the Lebanese proclamation it was taken to imply that any modification of the frontiers between Syria and Lebanon was out of the question.

Furthermore, all those who were opposed to the maintenance of French control, whether they were believers in Lebanese, in Syrian or in Arab nationalism, resented the references to France's "mission" in the Levant and the statement that the future treaty would be negotiated on the basis of the Treaty of 1936.

These criticisms were not lessened when it was announced that a Ministry had been formed, with Ahmad ed-Da'uq as Prime Minister, and composed of colourless personalities without any claim to represent the population.

II

The British Government approved of the Free French policy of proclaiming Syrian and Lebanese independence, and gave its formal recognition to both the newly independent States, in the shape of letters of congratulation sent by His Majesty King George VI, to the Syrian President on October 27th, 1941, and to the Lebanese on December 26th.

In February, 1942, Major-General Sir Edward Spears, who had been connected with the Free French movement since its beginning, and had been in the Levant as head of the "Spears Mission" since 1941, was appointed first British Minister to the Syrian and Lebanese Republics.

[1] For the French text, see Appendix A.13.

The members of the Ministry were, respectively Sunni Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Greek Catholic, Druze and Shi'i. Thus the convention which had grown up that the Cabinet should include representatives of all the more important sects was respected. The Ministers, however divided though they might be in religious allegiance, were united in desiring on the one hand a greater measure of self-government for Lebanon, and on the other closer relations between Lebanon and Syria.

17

Iraq recognized the independence of Syria in August and of Lebanon in October. In September the Egyptian Government announced its decision to recognize Lebanese independence and to establish legations in Damascus and Beirut. The Sa'udi Arabian Government also declared its intention to set up a legation in Damascus. These three Governments showed in this and in other ways their satisfaction with the restoration of constitutional rule in the Levant States.

These steps made possible a serious attempt by the Syrians and Lebanese to define their relations with each other, with France, with the other Arab countries and with the United Nations.[1]

[1] More recent events are summarized in the Postscript.

POSTSCRIPT: THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER, 1945, TO APRIL, 1945

CHAPTER XII carried the political history of Syria and Lebanon down to the restoration of constitutional forms and the assumption of office by national Governments (in Damascus in August, 1943, and in Beirut in September).[1] From the first it was clear that the nationalists did not regard their accession to power as the end of the national struggle. Syria and Lebanon had been formally recognized as independent in 1941, and the restoration of the constitutions could be regarded as the first step towards making self-government a reality; but there were still other steps to be taken. Some of them could not, it is true, be taken before the end of the war. In his proclamations of independence, General Catroux had explicitly stated that the needs of war required Syria and Lebanon to conduct their policy in accordance with that of the Allies. The Allies must assume responsibility for the defence of the country and its war production, and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should place their armed forces at the Allies' disposal for those purposes, as well as aerodromes, harbours and communications; and the closest collaboration should exist between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Free French Delegate-General on the one hand and the Syrian and Lebanese police and gendarmerie on the other. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments should also collaborate with the Allies in matters concerning the economic war, and should follow the general policy of the sterling bloc in the economic and financial spheres.[2]

Such restrictions were recognized to be necessary by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, which looked on them as a contribution they could make to the Allied war-effort. There were, however, other limitations upon their freedom of action.

First, there were limitations upon the legislative power of the two Governments, imposed on the one hand by the power of the Delegate-General to legislate by summary decree, and on the other by certain general reservations contained in the Syrian and Lebanese Constitutions. Thus Article 116 of the Syrian Constitution stated:—

'Aucune disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et

[1] See pp. 236, 237. [2] See pp. 245, 250.

ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations. Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et de la défense du pays, et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures. Pendant la durée des obligations internationales de la France, en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront pas applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les gouvernements français et syrien. En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ces responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord. Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux gouvernements.'

Secondly, there were a number of important administrative services which were wholly removed from the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and placed under direct supervision of the Delegate-General, who administered them through a staff which was largely French in the upper ranks, but Syrian and Lebanese in the lower. They included:

i. The 'Common Interests', a number of departments dealing with matters of concern to both Syria and Lebanon. The most important of them were the customs administration, the control of concessionary companies and certain economic, financial and social services. They were financed out of the 'Funds of Common Interest', consisting almost entirely of customs receipts, which were sufficient not only to pay for these services but to provide a large surplus which was in principle divided between the two Governments.

ii. The 'Troupes Spéciales', the local Syrian and Lebanese levies. Some thousands strong, they had been in existence throughout the Mandatory period as an integral part of the French Army of the Levant, and until the outbreak of war they had been wholly paid for out of the 'Funds of Common Interest'. They now formed part of the French territorial command.

iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organisation responsible for

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POSTSCRIPT

internal security. It had always been in French hands, although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

iv. The control of the Bedouin.

v. The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own politico censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.)

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed:

i. Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical 'conseillers', who, although officials of the Government and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

ii. Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the 'Services Spéciaux' who were stationed throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions: an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the 'Gardes Mobiles', a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole source of legislation; the transfer of the Common Interests and their similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; the abolition of the 'Services Spéciaux' officers and a curtailment in the powers of the 'conseillers'. It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to aid industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of

revenue. Control of concessionary companies would give them authority over the railway administration, the ports, the water and electricity companies and the tobacco monopoly, all of them in the hands of French companies and between them covering an important section of the country's economic life. The transfer of the "Troupes Spéciales" would make possible the creation of Syrian and Lebanese Armies.

Faced with these demands the Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (C.F.L.N.) defined its attitude sharply. In the first place, it claimed that it had inherited the Mandate from the French Republic; the Mandate conferred upon France certain obligations which neither she nor the Syrians and Lebanese were entitled to repudiate; they could only be ended or modified by the League of Nations or whatever organization might replace it. No definitive change of a radical kind could therefore be made until the League were revived or a successor to it established.

Secondly, the Committee, while admitting the possibility of a transfer of powers, sought to make it conditional on the willingness of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to conclude with them Treaties guaranteeing on the one hand the independence of the two States and on the other the special position and interests of France. The declarations of independence had foreshadowed the conclusion of such Treaties: and it was therefore claimed that the grant of independence had been conditional upon it.

Subsequently, under the pressure of events, the Committee admitted the right of the two Governments to demand immediate legislative and administrative concessions, but emphasized that the transfer of powers should take place in a correct way. In view of the importance of the issues involved, it should only take place after negotiation and agreement with the representatives of France. Any attempt to modify the present situation by unilateral action, without such formal agreement, could only be regarded as a deliberate insult to France.

To each of these theses the Syrians and Lebanese had an answer. To the first, they replied that they had never recognized the Mandate, which had been imposed upon them against their will and without their consent being asked.

Furthermore, they did not recognise the Algiers Committee as the legitimate inheritor of the Mandatory obligations of France. Even granting, however, that Free France had inherited the Mandate, General Catroux had proclaimed the independence of the two States, not as something to be granted in the future, but as something to take effect from the moment of his proclamation. It might be that technically Free France had had no authority to end the Mandate, but in practice the Mandate had ceased to exist on the day of his declaration; and unless Free France wished to go back upon the declaration and the proclamations of independence, she was bound henceforth to treat the Mandate as virtually a dead letter.

To the second argument, that the C.F.L.N. could only make the desired concessions in return for the conclusion of treaties, they replied that the declarations of independence, while envisaging the possibility of such treaties, had in no way made the grant of independence conditional upon their being negotiated. Independence had been given unconditionally (except for the limitations made necessary by the state of war); and if Syria and Lebanon were really independent, they had a right to decide for themselves whether or not to make treaties with a foreign State, and could not be forced into it by the threat that powers which were already theirs by right would otherwise be withheld. Furthermore, they had no intention of signing Treaties if at all, until after the war, since they had no reason to believe that France would then necessarily honour treaties concluded in her name by the C.F.L.N.

As for the third argument, that the concessions demanded could only be made by means of agreements, they, too, preferred that the questions at issue should be settled if possible through agreement with the C.F.L.N. But if the Committee were unwilling, as it at first seemed to be, they could not give up their right to take matters into their own hands. What did the independence of a State mean, if it could not unilaterally alter its constitution and establish its own administrative services?

Beneath these arguments and replies there lay an intense mutual distrust and suspicion, which were the real cause of the crisis. The nationalists of Syria and Lebanon had no confidence in the willingness of France ever to grant them genuine self-government. They were afraid that unless they

11: Hourani 8-4 (no date) 1968 MEC Syria (60)
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exerted pressure nothing would be done; and that after the war, if France's strength revived, she would attempt to re-establish her position by force. It was therefore vital for them, while it was possible, to put themselves in a position in which the opposition of France to their aspirations could no longer harm them. It was particularly important to obtain possession of those administrative services which had always been used as instruments of French policy, and might still be used to obstruct the new Nationalist governments during the war and subsequently to overthrow them: the *Sûreté Générale* and the *Services Spéciaux*, the Funds of Common Interest, the Troupes Spéciales.

The French on their side regarded the claims of the Syrians and Lebanese as part of a movement which was primarily and deliberately anti-French, and of which the purpose was to take advantage of France's weakness in order to destroy French influence in the Levant. They would have preferred to make no concessions to Arab nationalism at all; but since they were bound to do so in virtue of promises already made, they would only do so in return for a guarantee of their position and interests. To give up the Common Interests and other services, the one bargaining counter they had, without obtaining such a guarantee would be a severe blow to French national prestige and to the movement of revival which since 1941 had placed a symbolic value upon Syria and Lebanon.

3

The neighbouring Arab States were deeply concerned in the struggle of Syria and Lebanon for self-government. They had always been interested in it because of ties of language and sentiment; but in 1943 the matter became even more important because of the current discussions on Arab unity. Reference has already been made to these discussions in Chapters XII and XIII. It has been mentioned that after the re-establishment of constitutional forms in Syria, Nahhas Pasha invited the Syrian Government to send representatives to discuss the Arab question with him. The Syrian delegation visited Cairo in October and held conversations on Arab unity with the Egyptian Premier; its visit aroused much public attention in Egypt, and it was generally expected that a Lebanese delegation would soon follow it to Cairo. Thus the Levant States were drawn into the movement for unity; for

political, strategic and economic reasons it was impossible to conceive of an Arab union in which they were not included; but it was clear that they could not take an effective part in that movement until they possessed self-government and effective freedom of political action. It was therefore a general Arab interest to see Syria and Lebanon possessed of self-government. More than that, if a crisis should arise over the grant of self-government, it would be vital for the other Arab countries to give what help they could to the Syrians and Lebanese, because such a crisis would be a test of the effective strength of Arab unity. In regard to Lebanon there was a special reason for going to her help: Lebanon was only half-heartedly Arab nationalist, and nothing would strengthen her Arab sentiment so much as a practical demonstration of the concern of the other Arab countries for her welfare and of the benefits she could obtain from their assistance.

4

It was in fact the Lebanese Government which first challenged the French on the issue of the transfer of powers. The new Prime Minister, Riyadh as-Sulh, made a statement of policy to the Chamber on October 7th, 1943, announcing the Government's intention to propose a revision of the Constitution. This, he said, would be purged of all provisions inconsistent with the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, so that henceforward no authorities other than the legitimate representatives of the nation would participate in its government. During the following weeks the Government, while preparing its constitutional measure, was also engaged in controversy with the French authorities as to its right to modify the Constitution without previous agreement with the Mandatory Power. The controversy was made public by C.F.L.N. in a communiqué dated November 5th. This stated that the Committee could not recognize the validity of a unilateral revision of the Constitution; but that this decision did not affect the determination of France "to accord Lebanon complete independence by means of negotiations conducted between the two parties in the spirit of loyal and friendly collaboration which must continue as in the past to inspire the special relations uniting Lebanon and France". The Lebanese Government proceeded with the arrangements they

had made for submitting their measure to the Chamber, where it was carried by 48 votes to none on the 8th. The amendments affected the following Articles of the Constitution:

Article 1. References to the Mandatory Power and the League of Nations were eliminated, and Lebanon was described as "a sovereign State".

Article 11. French was no longer described as an official language.

Article 52. The treaty-making power was no longer to be limited by the reservations laid down in the Mandate.

Articles 50-54. These were annulled. They had provided that the exercise of the constitutional powers of Lebanese authorities should be subject to the maintenance of the Mandatory's rights and obligations; that Lebanon should eventually enter the League of Nations through the good offices of the Mandatory; that good relations would be maintained with "the neighbouring countries under French Mandate"; that disputes liable to lead to war should be submitted to the Mandatory's arbitration; and that agreements would be reached between Lebanon and France for the representation of the former, in countries where Lebanese residents were numerous, by means of attachés in French diplomatic and consular missions.

Articles 93 and 102. References to the Mandate were omitted.

On November 10th, two days after the passage of these amendments through the Chamber, M. Helou returned from a visit to Algiers. In the early hours of the following morning the Lebanese President and the majority of the Ministers were, by his order, arrested and removed from Beirut. A few hours later the Delegate-General issued decrees declaring the amendments null and void, suspending the Constitution, dissolving the Chamber and appointing Emile Edde—Bishara al-Khuri's unsuccessful opponent in the recent elections—as Head of the State and the Government.

These measures caused immediate and vigorous reactions, both in Lebanon and elsewhere. Throughout the next eleven days there was a general strike in the Lebanese towns; shops were shut, the ordinary newspapers ceased to appear and there were demonstrations in the streets. These led to clashes with

POSTSCRIPT

French troops, and to the death or injury of a number of civilians. The two Ministers who had not been arrested, together with a majority of the Deputies, continued to assert their authority from a mountain retreat and began to organize an armed force.

During these critical days the Lebanese people displayed striking unity. The national cause took precedence over deep-seated sectarian conflicts, and very few even among the Maronites dissociated themselves from the united front. Eddé failed to form a political cabinet, and was forced to attempt the expedient of a council of civil servants.

Nevertheless, the country remained outwardly calm. That the Lebanese did not resort to an armed rising was due in large part to the confidence of their leaders in the value of the diplomatic support which they received from the Governments of the independent Arab States, of the United States and of Great Britain. The British attitude was defined by Mr. Law in the House of Commons on November 23rd:

> "The interest of His Majesty's Government in this dispute is twofold. First of all, we have endorsed the promises of independence given to the Lebanese people by General Catroux in 1941. His Majesty's Government have followed with sympathy and interest the subsequent development of constitutional government in the Lebanon. Secondly, the Lebanon is of vital importance to the war effort both as an operational base and from the point of view of communications. Any threat of a breakdown of law and order is therefore of direct concern to His Majesty's Government."

Impressed by the gravity of the situation created by M. Helleu's drastic action, the C.F.L.N. sent General Catroux to take charge in Beirut. He arrived there on the 19th and, having examined the situation in all its aspects, recommended the reinstatement of the Lebanese President, the release of the imprisoned Ministers and the recall of M. Helleu. Acceptance of this programme was announced in Algiers on the 22nd, and on the following day the Lebanese leaders returned to Beirut in triumph. It was at once apparent that the reinstatement of the Ministers, as well as of the President, was inevitable, and the French authorities agreed to this further concession. Furthermore, M. Chataigneau, who had provisionally taken M. Helleu's place as Delegate-General, cancelled the decrees

of November 11th with the exception of that which declared the constitutional amendments null and void.

3

The acute crisis was now over, but the problem from which it had sprung was still unsolved. When the Lebanese Chamber re-assembled, the Premier asserted his Government's view that the reforms of November 8th were still in force. Moreover, the Syrian authorities lost no time, once the tension in Lebanon was relaxed, in taking parallel action. At an extraordinary session of the Syrian Chamber on January 24th, 1944, the President of the Republic and the Deputies took an oath of allegiance to a new Constitution which comprised Articles 1–115 of the existing text. The effect of this was to amend Article 116. Earlier, on December 1st, the Syrian Premier had declared that Syria did not recognise the Mandate, and was not willing to conclude a Treaty as a condition of the transfer of powers which properly belonged to her; had demanded the surrender by the French of all the attributes of sovereignty, under those limitations only which were occasioned by the state of war; and had affirmed that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were in agreement on the administration of the common interests.

The C.F.L.N. left these claims and assertions unchallenged, and announced that General Catroux would again go to Beirut, this time for the purpose of negotiating with the two Governments on the transfer of powers. The negotiations resulted in an agreement, concluded on December 22nd, which provided that the powers previously exercised by French authorities in the name of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments should be transferred to their control. They would take over the services included in the category of Common Interests as from January 1st, and other powers by specific agreements still to be concluded. Thus, by the beginning of 1944, the two States had survived a sharp test of their will to independence and had extended the range of their autonomous administration.

6

In the course of the year 1944 there were a number of changes in the political situation in Syria and Lebanon. Some of these changes were of no more than local importance,

POSTSCRIPT

Thus, in October the Ministry of Saadallah al-Jabiri in Syria was replaced by that of Faris al-Khuri, who had previously been President of the Chamber; the change was made for internal political reasons, and the new Government was composed largely of the same Ministers and followed the same general policy as its predecessor. In April, 1945, the Ministry was reconstructed. In Lebanon, too, there was a ministerial change: in January, 1945, the Government of Riyadh as-Sulh was replaced by that of Abdul-Hamid al-Karami, a Sunni Moslem deputy from Tripoli.

A change affecting the structure of the Syrian Republic took place in September, with the incorporation of the province of Jebel Druse fully in the Syrian State. It had already been formally incorporated in February, 1942, but had preserved a special administrative and financial régime which was now abolished. This step was taken at the request of the Administrative Council of Jebel Druse. A similar step was not taken in the Alawi province; although there was a party in favour of it, the forces of separatism were still strong, and the situation was complicated by the existence of disorder and unrest fomented by Sulaiman Murshid and his associates.

Other changes of greater importance, because they affected more immediately the problem of Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian relations, were the transfer of power to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and the financial agreement of February, 1944:

(i) In accordance with the agreement made by General Catroux with the two Governments on December 22nd, 1943, a series of particular agreements was negotiated during 1944, and by the end of the year almost all the services in question had been formally handed over, including the Customs Administration, the Financial and Economic Services, the control of the tobacco monopoly and concessionary companies, the Press Censorship, the Beirut control and the "Sûreté Générale" (although a French "Sûreté aux Armées" was retained). These transfers gave the two Governments almost all the attributes of independent governments. At the end of 1944 the only important attribute which had not been transferred was the control of the local levies, the "Troupes Spéciales".

In regard to the 'Services Economiques' and certain other departments, the experiment was tried of administering them by joint Syro-Lebanese commissions; but for the most part the transferred services were administered separately by the two Governments. To the more ardent nationalists, this was an unsatisfactory element in a transfer which was otherwise to be welcomed. They complained also that the transfer was more in name than in reality, since for reasons of efficiency the French personnel of the services was retained temporarily.

In February, 1944, an Anglo-French financial agreement was signed. It named a "franc area" composed of all territories under the control of the French Committee of National Liberation, and fixed the rate of exchange at 200 francs to the pound sterling. With the agreement of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, a special area fixed the rate of exchange of the Syro-Lebanese pound at 22.65 francs (it had previously been 20 francs), and thus prevented any change in the present rate of 2.83 Syro-Lebanese pounds to the pound sterling. The French Committee also agreed to receive certain franc assets of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, to restore the gold formerly held by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, and, should there be any further modification in the value of the franc, to guarantee the Syro-Lebanese pound against any resulting loss.

The agreement was widely criticized in Syria and Lebanon. It was regarded as contravening the allied declarations of June, 1941, which promised Syria and Lebanon full membership of the sterling bloc. Moreover, by weakening the link between the pound sterling and the currency of the two States, it created barriers between them and the other Arab States at a time when the movement for closer association between the Arab countries was gathering renewed strength. More important still, it was observed that the agreement was only temporary, and could be terminated by either party at three months' notice. When it should come to an end, there was a danger

POSTSCRIPT

that the Syro-Lebanese currency would once more share in the precarious fortunes of the franc; and its reserves would be under the control of the French Government, which might be tempted to use this control in order to strike a hard political or financial bargain.

7

It has already been mentioned that by the end of 1944 all important services administered by the Delegation-General had been transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, with the exception of the 'Troupes Spéciales'. These troops, whose numbers had been considerably augmented since the allied occupation in 1941, and who now formed a reasonably well-disciplined and well-armed force of several thousands, were under the French territorial command. Throughout the year the two Governments pressed for their formal transfer, while making it clear that for the duration of the war they would, of course, remain at the disposal of the Allied Command. The French Government was unwilling to transfer them until the end of the war, or at least until a later stage in it, and was not prepared to give them up unconditionally but only in exchange for the conclusion of treaties of alliance with France by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; the possession of the 'Troupes' was, in fact, their only direct bargaining-counter in their attempt to persuade the two Governments to sign such treaties.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments for their part did not admit that the question of the 'Troupes' had anything to do with the question of the treaties. In their eyes the transfer of the 'Troupes' was a logical consequence of promises and declarations already made by the French: General Catroux, in his declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in 1941, had stated that the two States were at liberty to raise national armies. Moreover, the transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales' was a necessary preliminary to any negotiations for a treaty; such negotiations could only take place on a footing of complete equality, and equality could not exist so long as the Syrian and Lebanese Governments did not possess armed forces and so long as the French held over their heads the threat of refusal to transfer the 'Troupes'.

In addition to insisting on their right to control the

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'Troupes,' the two Governments emphasized their need for them. The experience of 1936-1939 had shown what a mockery was self-government so long as the Government had not sufficient forces at its disposal to assert its will. No Government could expect obedience and respect so long as it was not able to curb the pretensions of the overmighty subject; this was particularly true of a country like Syria, where semi-feudal tenures were still to be found, localism was so strong a force, and there existed large Bedouin tribes traditionally recalcitrant to civil government and having had full opportunity to arm themselves during the war. Local disorders had already taken place among the Bedouin in the Jezirah and in the area dominated by Sulaiman Murshid. It was impossible to rely entirely upon French-controlled forces to prevent disorder, since that would be to admit that France was still the real power in the country and the Government only a façade; loyalty and obedience would only be given where real authority lay.

There was another reason for the attitude of the Syrian Government. They remembered that in 1920 the French had occupied Damascus and overturned the national Government by force; and that in 1925 the national revolt had been suppressed with the help of local levies drawn from the Circassian and other minorities. They were afraid that at some time in the future the French Government might be tempted to repeat its action and to restore its authority in Damascus with the help of the 'Troupes Spéciales', who included a large number of Circassians, Kurds and other minorities organized in separate units. Since the 'Troupes' were the only considerable armed force under French command in the Levant, their transfer to the local Governments would remove this weapon from the hands of the French.

For all these reasons the Syrian and Lebanese Governments demanded the immediate and unconditional transfer of the 'Troupes Spéciales', or else, if this were refused, their disbandment. Otherwise they would proceed with the formation of national armies. Both Governments made special appropriations for this purpose in their 1944 and 1945 budgets.

With this fundamental difference of opinion between the French point of view and that of the Syrians and Lebanese, it is not surprising that when discussions on the subject opened in the early months of 1944 they led to little result. A draft

agreement was, it is true, reached between the Syrian Government and the Delegate-General, General Beynet, but negotiations were then broken off by the French Committee in Algiers. With Lebanon a limited agreement was reached; in June it was arranged that a battalion wholly officered by Lebanese would be placed at the disposal of the Lebanese Government pending the conclusion of a general agreement. By the end of the year no further progress had been made, and the new year opened with demonstrations in Damascus in favour of the formation of an army and against what was believed to be the too indulgent attitude of the Government towards French delays.

8

A still more fundamental question, that of the conclusion of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese Treaties, became urgent during 1944.

The French Government claimed that, in spite of the declarations of independence made in 1941 and the subsequent transfer of powers, legally the Mandate still remained in force and would remain until a restored League of Nations or another international authority should bring it to an end; as in the case of Iraq, a necessary preliminary to its being brought to an end was the conclusion of treaties of alliance and friendship with the Mandatory Power. They pointed out that the declarations of independence had referred to the negotiation of such treaties, and even claimed that independence had not been granted unconditionally but only on condition that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments entered into treaties with France. They referred further to Great Britain's recognition of France's pre-eminent and privileged position in the Levant, and maintained that treaties were necessary in order to define and safeguard her position.

France's insistence on the signature of treaties had several motives. There was first her desire to preserve her political, economic and other interests in the Levant States themselves. Again, there was the fear that a withdrawal from the Levant would lower her prestige in North Africa and encourage the demands of the nationalists there. Moreover, so long as Metropolitan France was not liberated, the Fighting French were naturally reluctant to give up a particle of their position anywhere in the world where they still retained it. The

11: Stewart 5-4 (no date) 1968 MEI Syria/Leb

Liberation of France in the course of 1944 deprived this factor of its importance, and there were signs that those who had worked in the movement of resistance inside France were less interested in the Levant and less insistent on retaining their rights there than those who had been associated with General de Gaulle. (The liberation also worked in the other direction, however; it enormously strengthened the bargaining position of the French Government in their dealings with the Levant States and with the great Powers.)

There was another factor of great importance in determining France's attitude. For more than twenty years a natural process of events had been tending to draw Syria and Lebanon into the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence, economically and culturally, no less than politically. In part this was an aspect of a world-process, the gradual extension of Anglo-Saxon influence everywhere; in part, however, it was due to local conditions, to the fact that Syria and Lebanon were integral parts of the Eastern Arab world in which British influence was dominant. The war had strengthened this tendency: on the one hand, France's power in the world had declined in proportion to that of the Anglo-Saxon powers, and on the other, the movement for Arab unity was drawing close the ties between Syria and Lebanon and their neighbours. It was, therefore, possible that if France withdrew from the Levant States her place would be taken by Great Britain, inevitably and without any deliberate British intention. France would thus have withdrawn, not in favour of Syrian and Lebanese independence, but in favour of another world Power. Even a Frenchman who believed in Anglo-French friendship and had no suspicion of British intentions could not regard this prospect with pleasure.

The treaties which the French Government contemplated were similar in principle to the Anglo-Iraqi agreement, but rather more onerous in some ways. It wanted a military convention giving it the right to use a number of naval, military and air bases, and to send a military mission to organize the Syrian and Lebanese armies; a diplomatic and consular convention giving France's representative in the Levant States precedence over other members of the diplomatic corps, and providing for the care of Syrian and Lebanese interests by France's representatives in those countries in which the States were not directly represented; a cultural agreement

safeguarding the position of the French language and culture in education; a financial agreement perpetuating the connexion between the Syro-Lebanese currency and the franc; an undertaking by the two Governments to employ French advisers and technicians in preference to nationals of other States; and adequate guarantees for the position of French schools, concessionary companies and other institutions. It is probable, however, that the more far-sighted and moderate members of the French Government did not believe they had any chance of obtaining a settlement so favourable as this, and would have been satisfied with any agreement, however tenuous, which would enable them to save their faces.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments, for their part, were unwilling to bind themselves to France by such comprehensive treaties. They denied the French assertions that the Mandate was still in force, that it could only be extinguished after the conclusion of treaties and that the declarations of independence had been conditional on such treaties being made. Their attitude sprang partly from distrust based upon twenty years' experience of Mandatory rule, the memories of 1920 and 1925, past attempts to negotiate treaties and the cession of Alexandretta. It was due also to the belief that Syria and Lebanon had nothing to gain from such a close alliance with France. Their independence was already recognized by the world and did not need protecting. Moreover, France would not be in a position to protect them effectively, and they had not sufficient common interests with her to justify their linking their fate with hers permanently. The Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iraqi Treaties were 'points of equilibrium', based upon and expressing essential common interests, not creating a new situation so much as formalizing one which already existed. But a Franco-Syrian or Franco-Lebanese treaty on the same model would not be a 'point of equilibrium', but an obstacle in the way of the natural development of the Levant States and could not therefore constitute a definitive settlement.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments were unwilling, therefore, to sign an exclusive military convention with France; to link their currency permanently with the franc; to bind themselves to employ only French officials in their administrations; to give such cultural undertakings as would limit their freedom of action to plan their educational systems as

11: Hourani 3-4 (no date) 1968 MDI Syria

they thought fit; or in general to enter into any engagements which would place obstacles in the way of their closer association with their neighbours. Nor would they give a privileged position to any other Power. It was clear, however, that they would be willing to negotiate treaties of alliance and friendship with all the major Powers, France among them, and to take their full share in the task of guaranteeing international security, under the supervision of whatever international authority might be established. They would also be willing to recognize the position of French cultural and economic institutions functioning in the Levant States and to give guarantees for their freedom of action; for example, they would give assurances for the position of French concessionary companies and French schools, always provided that they confined themselves to their proper functions and did not use their freedom for political ends. They would also give guarantees to French officials and advisers in their service.

In the course of 1944, tentative discussions but not official negotiations took place with a view to clarifying the position of the two parties. They led, however, to no agreement between the two points of view, and at the end of 1944 the question of the treaty was no nearer settlement than it had been at the beginning.

9

The great mass of Syrian political opinion was behind the Government in its attitude towards the Army and the Treaty; if it differed from the Government, it differed in being more intransigent and less inclined to endure delays or make concessions. It was clear that, should a clash come, the French authorities could not fall back upon their old expedient of installing a 'moderate' ministry of puppets. The present governing group indeed was the most moderate that could be expected. It had already lost some of its popular support and had been severely criticized in the Chamber on account of its efforts to restrain the impatience of the people, and was only kept in power by the absence of any alternative and the personal ascendancy of the President.

In Lebanon, too, the attitude defined in the preceding section was held by the greater part of the Government and of the political public, but not so unanimously and unreservedly

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1960 MDI Syria
Lebanon 1961

as in Syria ; and the external question of relations with France was complicated by various internal questions.

Before 1943, there had been a reasonably clear division of opinion in Lebanon. On the one side stood the Maronites and other Uniates, with a number of the other Christians and heterodox Moslems ; they were in favour of Lebanese independence within its present enlarged frontiers and under French protection. On the other side were the greater part of the Moslems and the non-Catholic Christians, and all, Christians and Moslems alike, who held Arab nationalist views. They were opposed to Lebanese independence under French protection, and in general desired the reduction of Lebanon to its old frontiers and the replacement of independence by autonomy inside the Syrian State.

In November, 1943, the greater part of both groups united in opposition to France : the second group because they had always been opposed to French domination and the first because, while they had wanted French protection, they were not willing to be treated as mere tools and were sincerely attached to their independence. Their resistance was successful, and resulted in the gradual transfer of powers to the Lebanese Government and a partial withdrawal of French influence. (This process had already begun, but was accelerated by the November crisis.) This, in its turn, modified the internal political balance of Lebanon. So long as French influence had been paramount, it had been used in order to maintain the predominance of the Maronite and pro-French element. Now that French influence was diminishing however, this element could no longer retain its dominant position. The Maronites did not constitute a majority of the population, and even inside the Maronite community pro-French feeling was not so strong as it had been. The way was open for other groups to secure power in Lebanon.

This change in the internal situation itself led to further changes in political feeling. The more extreme of the Maronites and Lebanese separatists hoped for the restoration of French influence, and were now willing, if necessary, to accept a reduction in the size of Lebanon which would give it once more a large Christian majority. At the other extreme were some of the Moslems, who were now willing to accept the independence of Greater Lebanon for tactical reasons : either from personal interest or in the hope that in a few years' time, when their

11: Hourani 3-4 (no date) 1948 MDI Syria (ND)
Lebanon (ND)

greater natural increase had given the Moslems a majority in Lebanon, they would be able to destroy the independence of Lebanon and incorporate it in Syria.

Between these two extremes there was a more balanced and moderate group. Although many of its members had opposed the independence and enlargement of Lebanon in the past, they were now willing to accept Lebanese independence within its present frontiers, but only on two conditions: the first that Lebanon followed a policy of real independence and was not subservient to France or any other Power, and the second that she co-operated closely with the other Arab States. This group included both Moslems and Christians. Its policy was based upon a number of considerations. Some of the Christians wanted an independent Arab Lebanon as a centre of Arab Christian civilization, others because they no longer believed in the possibility of French or other foreign protection and wanted an alternative. Some of the Moslems advocated Lebanese independence inside an Arab union as a means of gradually teaching the Christians to forget their fears of Arab nationalism. Others again, both Christians and Moslems, hoped that Lebanon might play a special part in the Arab world, as a centre of Western civilization and lay nationalism.

The possibility of a stable Lebanon depended entirely on this intermediate group. The success of this group, in its turn, depended on its discovering some basis of unity sufficient to neutralize the centrifugal force of sectarianism. The need for such unity led to an attempt to develop a specifically Lebanese Arab nationalism. It was also one of the causes, although by no means the only one, for the spread of Communism which was one of the features of the year in Lebanon, and also to a smaller extent in Syria.

None of these groups was fully organized or articulate, and the Lebanese political scene changed continuously and rapidly. One factor however remained stable: the majority of the population no longer wanted or believed in French protection, and any attempts by France to split Lebanon from Syria on the question of the treaty were bound to fail.

10

The question of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations was complicated by its connexion with the question of Anglo-French relations in the Levant. Great Britain's policy

in the Levant States was based upon two commitments undertaken in 1941: first, her endorsement of General Catroux's declarations of Syrian and Lebanese independence, and secondly, the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement, by which Great Britain recognized France's privileged and pre-eminent position over any other European power in the Levant, subject to the essential condition that Syria and Lebanon should be given independence. Behind these two undertakings there lay two interests. On the one hand, Great Britain was vitally interested in securing stable, friendly and contented régimes in Syria and Lebanon. The experience of the last decades had shown that any movement of unrest or discontent in the Levant States would have immediate repercussions in other Arab regions in which Great Britain was more directly interested. There was, moreover, a new consideration involved: as the Power which had occupied the Levant in 1941 and restored French rule there, Great Britain would be held responsible for what France did, and her intentions towards the Arab world as a whole would be largely judged by what happened in Syria and Lebanon. On the other hand, Great Britain urgently needed the friendship of France in Europe and the world; Anglo-French dissension in the Levant might react upon Anglo-French relations in the world; and such dissension was likely to arise if the French suspected that Great Britain was anxious for them to withdraw from the Levant in order to take their place. It was, therefore, of great importance for Great Britain to avoid giving any ground for this suspicion; this was the more difficult because of that natural tendency to the spread of Anglo-Saxon influence in the Levant which has already been mentioned. Syrian and Lebanese independence would in fact, and even with the severest of self-denying ordinances on the part of Great Britain, mean an extension of Anglo-Saxon influence; it was, therefore, essential for Great Britain to avoid giving the impression that she approved of this tendency and was trying to accelerate it.

It was clear from the beginning that, although it might be possible to reconcile these two interests, it would at least be difficult. From 1941 to the end of 1943, however, the need to try to reconcile them did not arise in an acute form, because the essential condition laid down in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement—the establishment of Syrian and Lebanese independence—had not yet been properly fulfilled. British efforts

were therefore directed to persuading the Free French to make their declarations of independence a reality by the restoration of self-governing institutions. These efforts led to considerable tension between Great Britain and Free France. Many Frenchmen refused to believe that British insistence on the independence of the two States was due only to a desire to fulfil the promises made in 1941. Their suspicions were directed particularly against the British Minister, Sir E. L. Spears, who continued to champion the cause of the Levant States with force and enthusiasm even after he was succeeded as Minister by Mr. T. A. Shone in December, 1944. Apart from the disagreement on general policy, there were other causes of tension: the difficulties arising from the combination of a British supreme command with a French territorial command, the existence of a network of British political and security officers, the inevitable clash of two very different temperaments and administrative systems.

This phase came to an end with the restoration of national government, the Lebanese crisis of November, 1943, and the subsequent agreement for the transfer of powers. In 1944 a new phase opened: the search for a definitive settlement of Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese relations. In this new phase it was no longer possible to delay the attempt to reconcile the two aspects of British policy. Short of denouncing one or other of her undertakings, only one course was possible for her. She must try to persuade both sides to make some sort of definitive agreement on paper. The exact terms of the agreement were secondary, so long as France secured such concessions as might be regarded as constituting a privileged position. What was important was that an agreement of some kind should be made and neither side should feel it had been forced out of its position or had lost prestige. To this end it was important to prevent a conflict or another crisis like that of November, 1943; and an essential means of preventing conflict was to refrain from leading either side to believe that, should a crisis come, it was certain of British support.

A definitive solution could only be reached, if at all, by free agreement; there was no question of forcing the Syrians and Lebanese to make a treaty. Nor, if a treaty was not made, could there be any question of abrogating the declarations of independence or a repetition of what had happened in 1920. On the other hand, should the French fail to secure a guarantee

of their position, there was no question of Great Britain's trying to usurp their place or profit from the wreckage of their hopes.

Finally, in all this complex situation, Great Britain must remember that she was only one of a number of interested Powers, who had their own views on the question and who had not endorsed the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement. While trying to secure the fulfilment of that agreement, Great Britain could not allow her policy to drift too far from that of her Allies.

This general line of policy was authoritatively defined by Mr. Churchill in his speech in the House of Commons on February 27th, 1945. Reporting on the Crimea Conference, and his subsequent meetings with Arab leaders in Egypt, he said :

> 'Finally, we had the pleasure of a long discussion with President Shukri of Syria, in which we did our utmost to enjoin a friendly attitude towards the French and to encourage negotiation for a suitable settlement with the French, affecting not only Syria but also the Lebanon. I must make clear once and for all the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon, and in relation to our French Allies. That position is governed by the statements made in 1941, in which the independence of these Levant States was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time, and ever since, the British Government has made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant States. We are determined also to respect the independence of these States and to use our best endeavours to preserve a special position for France, in view of the many cultural and historic connexions which France has so long established with Syria. We hope it may be possible for the French to preserve that special position. We trust that these States will be firmly established by the authority of the world organization, and that French privilege will also be recognized.
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> 'However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian and Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both and we do not believe that they are incompatible. Too much must not therefore be placed on the shoulders of Great Britain alone.

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We have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States recognize and favour Syrian and Lebanese independence, but do not favour any special position for any other foreign country. All these and many other matters affecting the Middle East are fitting and necessary subjects for the Peace Conference, at which we must resolutely strive for final settlements of lasting peace between all the States and races comprised in the Middle East and in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean."[1]

II

The last sentence of Mr. Churchill's statement referred to a new factor which had made itself felt in the past year. Since 1941, the United States of America had refrained from recognising the independence of Syria and Lebanon, and had made it clear that she would not give recognition until the independence of the two States became a reality. By 1944, the transfer of powers had reached a point where the U.S. Government felt itself justified in changing its attitude. In September, it formally recognized the independence of the two States. Mr. George Wadsworth, who had previously been American Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent, was appointed the first U.S. Minister to the two States.

Already, in July, the Government of the U.S.S.R. had accorded its recognition. It appointed M. Solod as its first Minister in October.

Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., at the time of that recognition and subsequently, made it clear that they recognized Syrian and Lebanese independence unconditionally and that they did not accept the privileged and pre-eminent position of France or any other Power in the Levant. In other words, they did not endorse the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement of 1941.

A number of the States also gave their recognition, and by the end of the year the only important Allied or neutral State which had not yet done so was Turkey. A consequence of this change in the international status of the two countries was the appointment of a number of Syrian and Lebanese diplomatic and Consular representatives in foreign countries. The formal sovereignty of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments was further emphasized by their declaration of war on Germany and Japan in February, 1945, their signature of the declaration

[1] *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 408, col. 1,290.

11: Hourani 5-4 (no date) 1948 MEI Syria AGI LEBANON MEI

of the United Nations in April and their invitation to the San Francisco Conference.

12

Another development which greatly strengthened the position of the two States was the establishment of the Arab League. In the second half of 1943 and the first half of 1944 the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa an-Nahhas Pasha, had held a series of conversations on Arab unity with the representatives of other Arab Governments. On their completion, he decided to summon a preparatory conference or committee to draw a plan of union. The Committee met in Alexandria on September 28th, 1944. It was attended by representatives of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian, Sa'udi-Arabian and Yemeni Governments, and by a representative of the Palestinian-Arab parties. Its work was completed by the publication on October 7th of a 'Protocol', signed by the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq, and later adhered to by Sa'udi-Arabia and Yemen; the Palestinian, as not representing a Government, did not sign it.

The Protocol proclaimed the formation of a League of Arab States, composed of the independent Arab States which agreed to join it. It was to have a Council, on which the States would be represented on an equal footing. Its task would be to supervise the execution of agreements concluded between these States, to organize periodical meetings and to co-ordinate their political policies. The Council's decisions would be applicable to those who accepted them, but would be executory and obligatory in cases where disagreement arose between two members of the League and they sought the Council's intervention for its settlement. It would be forbidden to have recourse to force for the settlement of any dispute between members. Each State would have the right to conclude with other States, members or non-members of the League, treaties which were not in contradiction with the text or spirit of this agreement; no member was to follow a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League or any of its members. The Council would offer its mediation in any conflict that might arise between members of the League or with non-members.

A Commission was to be formed immediately by members of the Preparatory Committee with a view to drawing up the

11: Moyen-Orient 3-4 (no date) 1948 MD1 Syria
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statutes of the Council and examining political questions which might form the subject of agreements between the Arab States. Arab States represented on the Committee would co-operate closely on economic, financial, cultural, social and other matters. Commissions of experts for each type of question would be set up to draft plans for co-operation in these matters. When all the commissions should have concluded their work, the Preparatory Committee would meet to examine the results of their studies with a view to convening the general Arab Congress.

The Committee hoped that in the future the Arab countries would consolidate these first results with others, particularly if, after the conclusion of the war, institutions were created which would unite the nations with closer and stronger ties.

The Protocol also contained two special decisions, the one relating to Lebanon and the other to Palestine. The former stated that 'the Arab States represented in the Preparatory Committee affirm unanimously their respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers, which have already been recognized by their Governments after Lebanon had followed a policy of independence as proclaimed by her Government in its ministerial programme, which was unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on October 7th, 1943.'

The decision in regard to Palestine stated that Palestine constituted one of the important elements in the Arab world; the rights of the Arabs could not be touched without danger to the peace and stability of the Arab world. The Committee considered that the engagements entered into by Great Britain, comprising the cessation of Jewish immigration, the safeguarding of lands belonging to Arabs and the gradual evolution of Palestine towards independence, represented acquired rights of the Arabs and their execution would be a step towards the desired aim. The Committee proclaimed its support for the cause of Palestine. While sympathizing with the sufferings of the Jews, it thought that nothing could be more arbitrary and unjust than to settle the question of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, the victims of which would be the Arabs of Palestine.

The political sub-committee of the Preparatory Committee met in Cairo in February, 1945, to draft the constitution of the Arab League. After its work was completed, the Preparatory

Committee met once more in Cairo on March 17th. It included representations of the Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian and Sa'udi-Arabian Governments and of the Arabs of Palestine. On March 22nd the representatives of these six Governments signed the 'Pact of the Arab League' at the first meeting of the Plenary Arab Congress. It was not signed by the Palestinian delegate, since he did not represent an Arab Government. A copy was sent to the Imam of Yemen for his adherence.

The Pact, which differed considerably from the Protocol of Alexandria and in general was less binding upon the signatories, stated that the Arab League was composed of the independent Arab States signatory to the Pact; any independent Arab State could join the League on application. The object of the League was to draw closer the relations between member-States, to co-ordinate their political action, safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and interest itself in general in questions concerning the Arab countries; also to ensure that, within the framework of the régime and the conditions prevailing in each State, a close co-operation should exist in economic and financial questions, matters of communications, cultural matters, questions connected with nationality, passports and extradition, social affairs and public health. The League would have a Council on which each member-State would have one vote. The Council would try to realize the objects of the League, supervise the execution of agreements concluded between members, and determine the means by which the League would collaborate with such international organizations as might be formed in future. There would also be special commissions for each of the questions enumerated above; representatives of other Arab States would be able to participate in these commissions on conditions to be determined by the Council.

The Pact forbade the use of force to settle disputes between member-States. Decisions of the Council would be binding in disputes not affecting the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the States and in which the contending parties sought settlement by the Council. The Council would mediate in any dispute likely to lead to war between two member-States or a member-State and a third State. Decisions in cases of arbitration and mediation would be by a majority vote. In the case of aggression or the threat of it, the

11: Howard 5-4 (no date) 1948 MEH Syria A-W

State attacked could demand the immediate summoning of the Council, which would decide on the necessary steps by unanimous vote. Unanimous decisions of the Council would be binding on all members of the League, majority decisions only on those States which accepted them.

Each member-State undertook to respect the system of government of the other members and to abstain from any action tending to change that system. Member-States wishing to establish closer relations than those envisaged in the Pact might conclude agreements to this end.

The permanent seat of the League was to be Cairo, but the Council could decide to meet elsewhere. The Council would meet in ordinary session twice a year, in extraordinary session when necessary. The League would have a permanent Secretariat-General. (An Egyptian, Abdur-Rahman Azzam Bey, was appointed the first Secretary-General.) The expenses of the League would be shared by the member-States. The presidency of the Council would rotate among the representatives of the member-States.

Any member-State might withdraw from the League after a year's notice, and the Council might exclude any member which had not fulfilled its obligations, by unanimous vote. The Pact could be modified by a two-thirds majority of the member-States. The Pact was to come into force after four States had ratified it.

An annex to the Pact declared that the *de jure* international existence and independence of Palestine since her liberation from Ottoman rule could not be questioned. If, for reasons independent of her will, the external attributes of independence had not yet materialized, this could not constitute an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the Council. In these circumstances, and until she should enjoy the attributes of independence, the Council would choose an Arab representative from Palestine to participate in its work.

A further annex dealt with the participation of Arab countries not members of the Council in the work of the commissions to be set up under the Pact. The signatory States recommended the Council to go as far as possible in co-operating with them, and to make all efforts to learn their needs and understand their aspirations, and to use all political means possible to improve their conditions and secure their future.

11: Hourani 3-6 (no date) 1946

A week later, on March 31st, the Syrian Chamber ratified the Pact. It was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber on April 7th.

The formation of an Arab League, however loose, had immediate repercussions on the situation in the Levant States and will probably have further repercussions in the future. It made clear that in any conflict which might arise over the independence of Syria and Lebanon, they would have the full support of the Arab world; at the same time it provided another reason why the two States should keep their hands free and not undertake any commitments which might prevent their fulfilling their new obligations as members of the League.

The establishment of the Arab League may have particularly far-reaching consequences for Lebanon. Both at Alexandria and at Cairo the Arab States made it clear that they were prepared to go a long way to allay the fears which the thought of Arab union aroused in the minds of a section of the Lebanese Christians. The Lebanese article of the Alexandria Protocol emphasized that so long as Lebanon was willing to align her policy with that of the other Arab States she need not fear any demands upon her or claims for frontier revision, and could hope (as had been proved in November, 1943) for their support and help in her struggle for independence; while there is reason to believe that the clauses inserted into the Cairo Pact safeguarding sovereignty and freedom of action of the member-States were due to the anxiety of the Arab States to do anything possible to win the adherence of Lebanon. If their efforts should be vain, they would no doubt be forced to reconsider their attitude towards Lebanon.

APPENDIX A

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS

1. The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, July 24th, 1922.
2. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Syria, December 22nd, 1936.
3. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Lebanon, November 13th, 1936.
4. Exchange of Letters between Jamil Mardam Bey and M. de Tessan, December 11th, 1937.
5. Bonnet-Mardam Declaration and Protocol, November 14th, 1938.
6. Decrees of the High Commissioner in regard to the autonomy of Jebel Druze, the Alawis and the Jazirah, 1939.
7. Fundamental Principles of Future Status of Alexandretta, adopted by the League Council, January 27th, 1937.
8. Franco-Turkish Agreements on the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, July 4th, 1938.
9. Franco-Turkish Agreements on the cession of Alexandretta, June 23rd, 1939.
10. Proclamation of General Beynet concerning the Syrian Constitution, April 22nd, 1941.
11. General Catroux's Proclamation to the Syrians and Lebanese, June 8th, 1941.
12. General de Gaulle's Letter to General Catroux, June 24th, 1941.
13. Convention on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria and Lebanon, July 12th, 1941.
14. General Catroux's Proclamation of Syrian Independence, September 16th, 1941.
15. General Catroux's Proclamation of Lebanese Independence, November 26th, 1941.
16. Agreement and Protocols on the Transfer of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests, December 22nd, 1943-January 5th, 1944.

No. 1: *The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, July 24th, 1922.*[1]

The Council of the League of Nations,

WHEREAS, The Principal Allied Powers have agreed that the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, shall, within such boundaries as may be fixed by the said Powers, be entrusted to a Mandatory charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population, in accordance with the provisions of Article 22 (paragraph 4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and

[1] Q. Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1930), pp. 609-11.

APPENDIX A [illegible]

WHEREAS, The Principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for the territory referred to above should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it; and

WHEREAS, The terms of this mandate, which are defined in the articles below, have also been accepted by the Government of the French Republic and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

WHEREAS, The Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions; and

WHEREAS, By the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Article 1: The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the populations inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 2: The Mandatory may maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence. It shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, to organize such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory and to employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the said territory.

The said militia shall thereafter be under the local authorities, subject to the authority and the control which the Mandatory shall retain over these forces. It shall not be used for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory.

Nothing shall preclude Syria and the Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory stationed in the territory.

Article 5: The Mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make the [illegible] of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and the Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and fuel.

Article 6: The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon and with the right to issue exequatur to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers. Nationals of Syria and the Lebanon living outside the limits of the territory shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the Mandatory.

Article 7: The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

Article 8: The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon. Foreign consular tribunals shall, however, continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organizations provided for in Article 9.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 10, 1914, shall have previously consented the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application during a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall at the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Article 9: The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

Article 10: Pending the conclusion of special capitulation agreements, the capitulations treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the Mandatory shall apply within the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

Article 11: The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of difference in race, religion or language.

The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native language in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Article 9: The Mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of the Councils of management (Conseils de fabrique) or in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

Article 10: The supervision exercised by the Mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and the Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measure on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

The religious missions may also concern themselves with education and relief, subject to the general right of regulation and control by the Mandatory or the local governments, in regard to education, public instruction and charitable relief.

Article 11: The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination, in Syria or the Lebanon against the nationals, including societies and associations, of any state member of the League of Nations as compared with its own nationals, including societies and associations, or with the nationals of any other foreign state in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, or navigation, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Syria or the Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said states; there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the said territory.

Subject to the above, the Mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary. The Mandatory, or the local governments acting under its advice, may also conclude on grounds of contiguity any special customs arrangements with an adjoining country.

The Mandatory may take or cause to be taken, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, such steps as it may think best to ensure the development of the natural resources of the said territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

department, unless this department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archæological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archæological experience. The administrations of Syria and the Lebanon shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent department in a proportion fixed by that department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Article 15: Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in Article 1, an arrangement shall be made between the Mandatory and the local governments for reimbursement by the latter of all expenses incurred by the Mandatory in organizing the administration, developing local resources, and carrying out permanent public works, of which the country retains the benefit. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

Article 16: French and Arabic shall be the official languages of Syria and the Lebanon.

Article 17: The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said report.

Article 18: The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Article 19: On the termination of the mandate, the Council of the League of Nations shall use its influence to safeguard for the future the fulfillment by the Governments of Syria and the Lebanon of the financial obligations, including pensions and allowances, regularly assumed by the administration of Syria or of the Lebanon during the period of the mandate.

Article 20: The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatsoever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at London on the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

No. 2: *The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and Syria, December 1936, 1936.*[1]

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République syrienne, Vu l'intention exprimée par le Gouvernement français devant la Société des Nations de conclure, en tenant compte de l'évolution déjà accomplie, un traité avec le Gouvernement syrien ;

Considérant les progrès réalisés dans la voie de l'affermissement de la Syrie comme nation indépendante ;

Vu l'accord des deux Gouvernements pour réaliser, suivant un programme bien précisé, toutes conditions propres à assurer l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations, dans un délai de trois ans, à dater des formalités de ratification ;

Ont convenu à cet effet de conclure un traité d'amitié et d'alliance pour définir sur les bases de complète liberté, souveraineté et indépendance, les relations qui existeront entre les deux États après la cessation du mandat, et d'un fait, dans les conventions, protocoles et lettres annexes qui font partie intégrante du traité, les conditions et modalités d'application.

A cette fin, Son Excellence le Président de la République française et Son Excellence le Président de la République syrienne, ont délégué comme leurs plénipotentiaires :

S. E. le Comte de Martel, ambassadeur, Haut-Commissaire ;
LL. EE. Djemil bey Mardam, Président du Conseil, Sadallah bey El Djabri, Ministre de l'Intérieur et des Affaires étrangères, Choucri bey Kouatli, Ministre des Finances et de la Défense ;

qui, s'étant communiqué leurs pouvoirs et les ayant trouvés en due forme, ont conclu ce qui suit :

[1] Ministère des Affaires Étrangères : Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1936 (Paris, 1936), pp. xxv–xli.